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INTRODUCTION
Just about every week, some newspaper headline presents
us with a story involving the tension between mercy and re-
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tributive justice.' If it is not the Supreme Court ruling on threestrikes sentencing policy,2 then it is a decision about whether
sex offender notification statutes like so-called Megan's Laws
are unduly punitive restraints on those who have already been
punished for their crimes,3 or whether the mentally retarded
should be executed,4 or whether minors like D.C. sniper John
Lee Malvo should be tried in death penalty-eligible jurisdictions. Even beyond the news, this leitmotif pervades our movies,5 literature,6 musicals,7 and other facets of our popular
1. In this Article, "mercy" refers primarily to leniency afforded to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender's competence and ability to
choose to engage in criminal conduct. More controversially, I also use "mercy"
to encompass leniency that is motivated by bias, corruption, or caprice-even
though I recognize that such a definition encompasses more types of leniency
than colloquially used. As Jim Whitman points out, mercy, historically, has
been associated with leniency afforded for reasons of bias, caprice, or venal
self-interest. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 184-85 (2003) (detailing the tradition of pardons extended to anti-black offenders in America); id.
at 93 (discussing the contemporary tradition of European amnesties granted
to offenders on Christmas day in Germany or Bastille Day in France); id. at 67
(discussing the furor over Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich). One might be
tempted to call mercy based on compassion "popular mercy" and mercy based
on corruption, caprice, or bias "unpopular mercy." (Though as Whitman's examples illustrate, there may be a deeply popular flavor to blanket use of the
pardons on religious holidays or to offenders who reinforce majority norms of
discrimination.) The point I develop later in the text is that both popular and
unpopular mercy are equally problematic from the viewpoint of liberalism and
retributivism, and so together they are "mercy" and thus the unified object of
this Article's critique. Retributive justice refers to the justice achieved by the
state's infliction of commensurate punishment upon offenders of legitimate
and democratically authorized criminal laws. This Article examines the specific sanction of the criminal law. I leave aside the civil system's imposition of
punitive damages, which I address in a separate article entitled Retributive
Damages (manuscript in progress).
2. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding California's recidivism sentencing policy against constitutional challenge).
3. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
4. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
5. Some relatively recent and thoughtful cinematic treatments of this
tension include IN THE BEDROOM (Miramax Films 2001), UNFAITHFUL (20th
Century Fox Film Corp. 2002), and MONSTER'S BALL (Lions Gate Films 2001).
6. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2.
Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once, and He that might the
vantage best have took found out the remedy. How would you be, if
He, which is the top of judgement, should but judge you as you are?
0, think on that, and mercy then will breathe within your lips, like
man new-made.
Id.; see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
7. Perhaps one of the most well-known versions of this meme is spotted
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culture."
In a speech presented at the August 2003 meeting of the
American Bar Association, Justice Anthony Kennedy entered
this fray, catching many unawares. Known for joining or authoring many of the Supreme Court's ostensibly harsh decisions on matters of criminal justice,9 Justice Kennedy surprised
the nation-and no doubt the Ashcroft Department of Justicewith his calls both to Congress and to the executive branch for
reform of the criminal justice system. Specifically, Kennedy
asked Congress to give more discretion to judges in sentencing
and to eliminate mandatory minimum sentences. Kennedy further stated that the executive branch should "reinvigorate the
pardon process at the state and federal levels. The pardon
process, of late, seems to have been drained of its moral force.
Pardons have become infrequent. A people confident in its laws
and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy. " ' °
Kennedy's words attracted significant attention; shortly after the speech, the ABA announced it would establish a commission to study the issues brought to the fore by Justice Kennedy and to make recommendations. But few news stories
touched the nerve quite like that of former Illinois Governor
in the relationship between Javert and VaIjean in Les Miserables, the novel by
Victor Hugo that was transformed into a musical. VaIjean, sentenced to hard
labor for stealing bread to feed his sister's child, escapes prison and the everwatchful eye of Javert, VaIjean's prosecutor. Years pass, during which Valjean's political and economic fortunes rise while he lives as a fugitive under a
different identity. Eventually, his secret is exposed to Javert, who has been
tirelessly pursuing his quarry all these years. Naturally, the audience embraces the protagonist Valjean. One is inexorably drawn to his charisma and
kindness, sympathetic to his great "redemption," and mindful of the petty
charges that caused his initial immiseration anyway. But what of Javert? He
dies ignominiously and defeated, the law that he represents mocked. VICTOR
HUGO, LES MISERABLES (Charles E. Wilbour trans., Random House 1992)
(1862).
8. See William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture's
Theory of Revenge, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 161 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
9. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63 (2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). But see Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
10. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the ABA Annual Meeting 4
(Aug. 9, 2003) (transcript available at Supreme Court Press Office); see also
Bob Egelko, High Court Justice Crusades for Mercy: He Calls Sentences Too
Severe, Too Long, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2003, available at http://sfgate.com/
cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=chronicle/archive/2003/08/10/MN245049.DTL
("'I can
accept neither the wisdom, the justice nor the necessity of mandatory minimums,' Kennedy said. 'In all too many cases, they are unjust.).
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George Ryan's decision to commute the sentences of each death
row prisoner in Illinois." After half of the death row inmates
were exonerated due to various forms of legal error, Governor
Ryan decided on the eve of his departure from office to render a
blanket commutation. Immediately thereafter, throngs of citizens and politicians denounced Governor Ryan's action as the
product of a rogue executive, calling it lawless, unjust, and immoral. 12 Others saw him as courageous, merciful, and even heroic."
11. More precisely, Governor Ryan commuted three prisoners' sentences
to forty years and 164 to life without parole. He also pardoned several offenders whom he believed were erroneously convicted. See Stephen P. Garvey, Is It
Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution,Atonement and Mercy, 82 N.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=463101;
see generally David Firestone, Absolutely, Positively for Capital Punishment,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, Week in Review at 5 (discussing the political uproar over the pardons); John McCarron, New Era Trips Up Good Ol' George,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2003, at 21 ("How to remember George Ryan? Was he St.
George, who had the courage to slay our state's dragon of a death-penalty system? Or a latter-day Lucifer, who sold his previous office to gain the governor's

mansion.., only to lose the respect of history.").
12. See, e.g., Brian D. Crecente, Owens Blasts Death Row Move on TV,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Jan. 14, 2003, at 3A (quoting Colorado Governor
Bill Owens's characterization of the commutation as "an abuse of power");
Firestone, supra note 11 (reporting Senator Joseph Lieberman's characterization of the commutation as "shockingly wrong. It did terrible damage to the
credibility of our system of justice, and particularly for the victims. It was obviously not a case-by-case review, and that's what our system is all about.");
Editorial, Ryan Has Right on His Side, But He's About To Go Horribly Wrong,
CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 29; Cal Thomas, Departing Governor FlatOut Wrong on CapitalPunishment, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2003,
at 15A ("Ryan's decision is the type of decree usually associated with dictators."); George F. Will, Unhealable Wounds, WASH. POST., Jan. 19, 2003, at B7
(attributing to Governor Ryan a "cavalier laceration of the unhealable wounds
of those who mourn the victims of the killers the state of Illinois condemned").
13. See, e.g., Marie Cocco, Hastert Can Help Cut Death Penalty Errors,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 16, 2003, at A35 (calling Governor Ryan "an unlikely oracle of
moral wisdom"); Nobel Matchup: Bono vs. Ryan, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 2003, at 1
(comparing 2003 Nobel Peace Prize nominees Bono and Governor Ryan); William Raspberry, Mugged by the Reality of Injustice, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2003, at A23 ("Add the name of George Ryan to my short, short list of political
heroes."); Rod Dreher, Gov. Ryan Did the Right Thing, NAT'L REV. ONLINE
(Jan. 13, 2003), at http://www.nationalreview.com/dreher/dreher011303.asp
("Ryan might be headed for prison himself-he's leaving office today, and is
under criminal investigation for possible corruption; but he did the right thing
here."); STOP CAPITAL PUNISHMENT NOW!, THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR
GOVERNOR GEORGE H. RYAN COMMITTEE, http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.
org/ryan.html (last visited March 31, 2004) (advocating that Governor Ryan
receive the Nobel Peace Prize); cf Mary Laney, Time to Change Our Thinking
on CapitalPunishment, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at 15 (describing Governor Ryan's earlier moratorium on the death penalty as a "brave and just
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One goal of this Article is to deepen our understanding of
the tension between retribution and mercy, and by extension,
the implications of Justice Kennedy's remarks about mercy and
Governor Ryan's decision, by situating that tension within the
framework of liberal democratic discourse. 4 As the title indicates, my intention is to show what is wrong with mercy in the
criminal justice system. Although I present this case against
mercy drawing on an account of retributive justice that I have
been developing in the last few years, I want to highlight two
important conclusions of my argument: First, one need not be a
retributivist to share my anxieties'about the place of mercy in
our current constitutional structure. It is sufficient to be a liberal, that is, committed to the principle of equal liberty under
law, to be against mercy. Second, I will show that from a retributivist or liberal perspective, mercy based on compassion is
just as problematic as mercy motivated by bias or caprice.
To criticize mercy and to defend the law's apparently unyielding reach, one must ostensibly join the ranks of snitches
and schoolmarms. Nonetheless, this Article dons Javert's
cape," or something like it, to explain the attraction of resisting
mercy's call through retribution. Such effort seems necessary
because mercy, even when narrowly defined as leniency afforded on grounds of compassion, caprice, or bias, still has dangerous charms.
Indeed, while any person concerned about the values underlying our criminal justice system may be interested in the
argument here, there are at least four particular audiences for
whom this Article's argument is intended. The first group in-

thing").
14. I should make clear that Justice Kennedy's specific policy reformsshorter sentences, eliminating mandatory minimums, reinvigorating the pardon process-are not my concern here. They can each be potentially justified
on retributivist grounds, as will be made clear. The concern I have is with Justice Kennedy's apparent endorsement of these changes on grounds that a
.people confident in its laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy."
Kennedy, supra note 10, at 4. Though he leaves mercy undefined and elsewhere discusses the injustice of some of these sentences, I will assume Justice
Kennedy means mercy as leniency driven by compassion for the offender and
the proper application of human grace; Kennedy's speech, in urging more executive pardons, quotes William Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, observing
that "mercy is 'mightiest in the mightiest. It becomes the throned monarch
better than his crown.'" Id. (quoting MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1). For
this reason, I doubt Justice Kennedy understood mercy simply as leniency designed to correct injustices.
15. See supra note 7.
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cludes those who believe that the institutions and practices of
criminal justice should be arranged to permit or encourage a
greater role for compassion or bias than is currently allowed.16
The second audience comprises those scholars, policy makers,
or judges who do not forthrightly embrace compassion, caprice,
or bias as such, but who advocate legal reforms that will most
likely permit a higher incidence of compassion, caprice, or bias
in the criminal justice system. Two examples of such an audience come to mind. The first are those who, perhaps bolstered
by the Supreme Court's recent opinions in Apprendi v. New
Jersey7 and Ring v. Arizona, 8 support an increased use of juries in decisions affecting punishment. 19 A second example in16. On compassion, see, for example, Garvey, supra note 11; Robert L.
Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (2000); Eric L.
Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
288 (1993); Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation
of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501 (2000) (criticizing retributivism's position against mercy for not allowing leniency based on compassion
for an offender's rehabilitation); Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals:How Can
Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1472 (1990)
(reviewing JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
(1988)) (stating that "if I were a judge I would occasionally act mercifully,...
even if my act violated my job description. Perhaps some judges would refuse
to act this way, even in the most compelling circumstances. If so, I might
commend them for their judicial restraint, but for little else."); Brian L.
Vander Pol, Note, Relevance and Reconciliation: A Proposal Regarding the
Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA L. REV. 707
(2003) (advocating the introduction of statements urging leniency by families
of murder victims); cf. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998) (rejecting as mere "compassion-inflation" the argument, embraced by many circuit courts, that failure to permit an "exculpatory no" creates a "cruel
trilemma" for guilty defendants). Some reformers advocate changes that would
permit the introduction of greater bias. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J.
677 (1995).
17. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
18. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
19. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
ConstitutionalRole in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33
(2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L.
REV. 311 (2003). Barkow and Iontcheva rely on a rich history valorizing the
role of jury service as akin to democratic political participation. But whereas
Barkow believes that jurors should be responsible for finding any fact that
triggers a mandatory punishment or a new punishment range, Iontcheva goes
further, advocating that jurors be the primary decision makers of sentencing
(as is the case in six states, Iontcheva, supra, at 314). Holders of the pro-jury
view tend to embrace that position because it permits a larger role for a communal voice in sentencing. See, e.g., Barkow, supra, at 78; Iontcheva, supra, at
316 (celebrating the "democratic virtues of jury involvement" in sentencing
and contending that juries are more likely to bring legitimacy to the process of
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cludes those who advance vigorous rights for victims in sentencing. 0 Endowing jurors or victims with greater power in
sentencing increases the odds of leniency based on compassion,
caprice, or bias because some offenders will have compassionate, capricious, or biased jurors or victims while others will
not. 21 Third, the argument I make against mercy sharpens the
sentencing determinations). It is thus a permissible inference to conclude that
adherents to this position accept the possibility of a higher incidence of compassion, caprice, or bias. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 401 (1990) (detailing

the impact of a victim's race in the application of the death penalty in Georgia); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 109 (1989) (studying racial dis-

parities in capital sentencing in eight states); Michael D. Weiss & Karl Zinsmeister, When Race Trumps Truth in the Courtroom, in RACE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: HOW RACE AFFECTS JURY TRIALS 63 (Gerald A.
Reynolds ed., 1997); Barkow, supra, at 74-75 & n.186 (recognizing that juries
create a situation where "defendants may be treated disparately depending on
their own race or the race of their victims" and citing Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on
Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 82-85 (1993); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1626 (1985); Douglas 0.
Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 904-05 (1996)).
Iontcheva similarly acknowledges that juries appear to act in a biased manner
with respect to race or ethnicity, though she believes that such bias could be
curbed by judicial review. See Iontcheva, supra, at 362-63. Recognizing that
disparities resulting from sentencing are also a problem, she argues that this
problem could readily be reduced if jurors were given more information about
average sentences. Id. at 359-60.
Both Barkow and Iontcheva argue that the risks of bias are possible
"whenever any actor in the criminal justice system is given discretion to mitigate punishment." Barkow, supra, at 75; see also Iontcheva, supra, at 360-64.
The risks associated with jury outcome disparity seem to me to be dramatically different because all the other main actors in the criminal justice system
(police, prosecutors, judges, governors) are repeat players and are therefore far
more likely to be amenable to discipline by various institutional carrots and
sticks such as educational programs, incentives for career advancement, appellate reversal, re-election, or press criticism-to name just a few. The one-off
nature of jury membership renders jurors essentially immune from the carrots
and sticks that can reduce the incidence of improper compassion, caprice, or
bias.
20. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995) (advocating, inter alia, that victims be consulted in plea bargains). I note the obvious point that not all so-called victims'
rights are objectionable. While victims should have no special role in determining culpability or sentencing, I see nothing wrong with setting up governmental programs to help assist victims with whatever unique needs their experiences qua victim present.
21. As explained above, disparities based on compassion, caprice, or bias
can be reduced when the discretion in sentencing is held by repeat players
subject to incentives for misuse of discretion. See supra note 19.
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debate within the retributivist camp; I provide what I think is a
more defensible account of what reasons ought to serve as
grounds for leniency than some
. • •of the
22 major figures in this ongoing debate among retributivists. Finally, the argument I
make also indicates, as I suggested before, why liberals committed to the principle of equal liberty under law, and not only
retributivists, should be hostile to the unreviewable sites for
mercy within our criminal justice system.
Having explained to whom I am addressing my argument,

22. See, e.g., KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:
Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991).
Kathleen Dean Moore, for example, argues that retributivism-compliant pardons should be granted, inter alia, when a crime is justified, that is, when a
crime is conscientiously performed and when the act is morally justified.
MOORE, supra, at 11. Moore's desire to keep a space for pardoning a conscientious rebel reflects profoundly antidemocratic anxieties. Her book offers no account of who decides when an act that has been proscribed by legitimate democratic institutions under the constraints of a liberal constitution should
bypass these conventional authorities and receive the imprimatur of moral
philosophers. This well-intentioned but nonetheless reckless desire to leave a
safety valve of pardons for morally justified crime exemplifies the failure of
philosophers to confront questions about implementation with which lawyers
are obsessed. Cf. CESARE BECCARIA-BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND

PUNISHMENTS 159 (Edward D. Ingraham trans., Academic Reprints 1953)
("Let, then, the executors of the law be inexorable, but let the legislator be
tender, indulgent, and humane.").
Moore extends her theory of retributivist leniency to offenders of "excusable crimes," those offenders who gained nothing from the crime for one or
more of several reasons: the offender acted unintentionally and made full
reparations, he was the only victim of his crime, his crime repaired rather
than created an injustice, or the crime was coerced. MOORE, supra, at 11.
What Moore does not realize is that if there is a legally recognized excuse or
justification, such as duress or necessity, the person will never need a pardon.
To be sure, some types of excuses Moore would recognize are not legally based:
for example if the offender is the only victim of his crime. But determining
why this circumstance is an "excuse" requires an account that is at odds with
the premises of democratic action, which may engage in justifiable paternalism at times. The point is that the executive's pardon power or the judicial
branch's discretion should not be used as merely a device to further subjectively perceived flaws in the legislation emerging from the polity. This subverts basic rule of law values-unless, that is, the constitutional or statutory
arrangement expressly delegates that discretion. (Moore, however, does not
suggest this legal delegation as the basis for her recommendation.)
Furthermore, Moore wishes to extend leniency on retributivist grounds to
offenders who have suffered enough, someone "whose particular circumstances
would make him suffer more than he deserves." Id. Unfortunately, Moore conflates suffering with punishment and thinks retributivism is indifferent to the
distinctions that can be drawn between them, a point discussed in this Article,
infra, at note 84.
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let me suggest four reasons that may justify the present endeavor. First, I think prior retributivist critiques of mercy have
failed to grapple with what I call the democratic difficulty of
mercy, which is the difficulty presented to these critiques by
mercy that is authorized by constitutional or democratic laws
and institutions, such as the presidential pardon or grand jury
nullification. 3 It is difficult to speculate why these prior accounts have neglected the democratic difficulty: perhaps it is
because theorists of retributivism often have the training and
abstracting minds of philosophers rather than lawyers,2 4 and
therefore are less sensitive to institutional perspectives. 2' Regardless of the etiology of this problem, this Article attempts to
qualify the force of the critique against mercy from those critics
who view their arguments as consonant with liberal democratic
norms. Although I ultimately share prior retributivists' hostility toward mercy, I arrive at that conclusion for reasons not
fully recognized before.26 If the weaknesses of these prior retributivists' positions are revealed, we can better see the proper
implications of these views when applied to practical problems
in the criminal justice system.
Second, my approach to retributive justice differs from
previous accounts and in that way implicitly avoids some of the
challenges brought by retributivism's recent critics. For example, my approach does not rely on, and indeed rejects, "retribu23. Previous retributivist critiques of mercy have not realized the fullness
of the difficulty that mercy presents for legal retributivism. See, e.g., MOORE,
supra note 22; Kobil, supra note 22. Both Moore and Kobil argue, on retributivist grounds, that pardons or other forms of mitigation are occasionally appropriate to assure a tight connection between punishment and desert, but
neither consider how the relationship between retributivism and liberal democracy affects dispensations of leniency.
24. Exceptions exist, of course. Some retributivists are trained as lawyers
too, like Michael Moore. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997).

25. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?,5 BUFF.
L. REV. 321 (2002) (insisting that punishment is better justified as a political, not moral, phenomenon); cf RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING
THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (noting that the lawyerly virtues of the Supreme
Court's work must supercede calls from theorists that the Justices work as
historians or moral philosophers).
26. My claim that mercy is a failure of equal liberty under law, which is
similar to a claim that mercy is a failure of impartiality, is not itself new. See
WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 181-85 (discussing anxieties arising from egalitarian concerns about the pardon power in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
America). What is unusual, so far as I can tell, is that no critic of mercy has
observed the special difficulty legal retributivists face in critiquing constitutionally authorized sites of mercy.
CRIM.
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tive hatred," a notion developed by Jeffrie Murphy in Forgiveness and Mercy.27 Nor is it based on other emotions such as resentment 28 or vengeance." 9 Nor does it rely upon the "root idea
or metaphor.., that transgression creates an imbalance that
must be restored by the like suffering or privation of the
wrongdoer."" The account I offer abjures these notions and is
instead faithful to public legal ideals and a framework of inclusive positive law in liberal democracies. 3' Thus, to the extent
that the account I offer is coherent and attractive, it frustrates
the criticism that punishment qua retribution is merely a
primitive practice: instead, we can show that it is bound up
with our best understanding of how individuals and communities live well together. 2
Third, in developing the general argument, I explain how
retributivism can countenance leniency to offenders on retribu27. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 88110 (1988).
28. For the best discussion of punishment arising from resentment, or
ressentiment, see FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Random House 1967)
(1887).
29. For a defense of vengeance, see ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR
JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 41 (1990).
[Vengeance] is... a primal sense of the moral self and its boundaries.
By denying the reality or the legitimacy of vengeance we deny this
sense of the moral self and moralize away those boundaries of the self
without which it makes no sense to talk about dignity or integrity....
Not to feel vengeance may therefore be not a sign of virtue but a
symptom of callousness and withdrawal ....
Id.; see also Robert Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW
123 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). A more muted endorsement of revenge can
be found in Miller, supra note 8, at 161-202. See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 17 (2003) (giving "two cheers for
vindictiveness").
30. Rapaport, supra note 16, at 1511.
31. By inclusive positive law, I mean that the sources of law draw upon
not only discrete statutes or case law but also moral principles that are rooted
in the public legal culture of liberal democracy. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry,
Method and Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 1757, 1757 (2002) (reviewing JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001)) (characterizing Jules L.
Coleman as a leading proponent of this view).
32. I have in mind the recent attacks against retributivism found in Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843 (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to
Retribution, BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.conm
abstract=413660. In a separate future article, The ConfrontationalConception
of Retribution, I address these points of difference at length.
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tivist grounds for postconviction achievements. Insofar as this
argument is successful, it dissolves an important debate between proponents of postconviction clemency and their retributivist critics. 33
Finally, the retributivist argument I make for creating institutional spaces for the exercise of "justice-enhancing" discretion rests upon a novel adaptation of the public choice literature. It is a step, but only a step, toward reconciling the
aspirations of high theory with the sausage factory that is the
criminal justice system.
The trajectory of this Article can be mapped. Part I provides some background in the philosophy of punishment that
should help delineate what I mean by mercy and how it is distinct from forgiveness, and discretion. I then begin the argument of the paper in Part II by offering an abbreviated account
of retributivism that I call the confrontational conception of
retribution (CCR). Next, in Part III, I explain the basis for retributivism's hostility toward mercy. The essence of that critique focuses on a failure of justice. On this account, when
mercy is separated from concerns about an offender's culpability, it should be enfeebled as much as possible.
I contend, however, that once we examine the animating
forces of the CCR, this critique of mercy is sustainable only in
part. When scrutinized more closely, the retributivist critique
runs into previously unanticipated problems: the difficulties
associated with constitutionally or democratically authorized
sites for mercy. Specifically, I argue that the liberal democratic
nature of retributivism's premises works to qualify the argument against mercy. Notwithstanding the difficulties these
sites for mercy present for the basic critique, I contend that the
thrust of the retributivist argument against mercy perseveres,
showing that mercy is less a problem for justice (qua just deserts) than for equality under law. Two important implications
of this argument arise. First, as suggested before, one need not
be a retributivist to be allergic to mercy. So long as one is committed to the principle of equal liberty under law, then mercy is
unattractive within a properly liberal criminal justice system.
Second, mercy based on compassion is as problematic from the
liberal or retributivist perspective as it is when it is based on
caprice, corruption, or bias.
In Part IV, I highlight the unusual institutional implica33.

See infra note 103; text accompanying infra note 154.
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tions of my argument: specifically, that the realization of retributive justice requires institutions that preserve and license
the exercise of discretion, as distinct from mercy. This need for
justice-enhancing (or equitable) discretion is readily apparent
in light of retributivism's traditional insistence on protecting
the innocent from unwarranted punishment. Less obvious, perhaps, is why the need to preserve these sites for discretion is
especially urgent, given what Professor William Stuntz has
identified as the pathology of the politics of criminal law.34
Stuntz illustrates how the politics of criminal legislation tends
to yield overbroad statutes that require an even more nuanced
development of prosecutorial judgment than that which executive branch officials typically need to enforce broad legislative
delegations. These overbroad laws are designed to allow politicians to reap the political benefits of broad criminal legislation
without having to make the difficult decisions of application
and implementation. Thus, taking a cue from Aristotle, I argue
that sites for discretion are required in order to offset the potential inequities that might otherwise arise.35 Recognizing that
these sites for discretion are also often sites for unreviewable
mercy, and to avoid or minimize this potential for abuse, I suggest several potential reforms that would make available review where currently little or none exists: first, a greater use of
ombudspersons who will have third-party standing to investigate and enforce abuses of discretion in law enforcement and
prosecution declinations; second, judicial review for acquittals
under an appropriately crafted standard of review; and third,
use of ombudspersons to seek judicial review of executive leniency, which would force executives to provide reasons for the
use of the pardon power.3 6
34. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
35. See ARISTOTLE,

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

132-34 (David Ross

trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1988); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 269
(James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1974) ("All new laws, though
penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the hfllest and most
mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal ...").
36. I self-consciously do very little to flesh out these suggestions for reform, believing that they are better developed in a separate project. I recognize
that aspects of these recommendations stand at odds with some settled case
law under the Constitution, but it is important that we not confuse the familiar with the necessary. The Constitution itself changes both by amendment
and judicial revisitation; moreover, these ideas may be of interest or use for
nations whose terrain of criminal justice is more amenable to innovation. My
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The Conclusion summarizes these points and turns to a related question: whether there is any truth to the supposition
that retributivists oppose mercy in all spheres of life." I finish
by briefly exploring why mercy is worth caring about as a private virtue, even if it is better eliminated from the realm of
criminal justice.
I. SOME BACKGROUND TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT
A. RETRIBUTION AND CONVENTION
As I noted at the outset,38 I take retributive punishment to
be the state's infliction of some hard treatment upon an offender, after fair and reasonable procedures, on account of the
offender's conviction for violating a legal norm.39 The intensity
of the punishment and the trigger for the punishment are
products of democratic deliberation." On these questions of
primary focus for reform in this Article, then, are those sites where unreviewable leniency may be afforded, for example, the presidential pardon or the
grand jury. The United States Sentencing Guidelines are different in that
their application is subject to appellate review. Hence, I leave for another day
the way in which some of the argument made here applies to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.
37. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at 1504-05 ("Alien to the spirit of retributivism ... is the notion that we are obliged to forgive those who transgress against us, at least those who are contrite, and do penance or make restitution.").
38. See supra note 1.
39. John Rawls's oft-cited definition of retribution states that the retributive view of punishment is based on the idea that
wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person
who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing....
[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not; and
it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955). Notice several differences between Rawls's view, which is the moral view of retributivism, and the definition I offered in the text, which is essentially a legal view of
retributivism. Rawls does not mention the state, nor does he limit the scope of
wrongdoing to legal offenses. He also characterizes retributivists as being unconcerned with the consequences of the inflicted punishment. As I explain
later, to be unconcerned with consequences is to breach the central maxim underlying retributivism-namely, that citizens must take responsibility for the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions; that maxim applies to
retributivists as much as to offenders.
40. The infliction of hard treatment serves as the state's coercive measure,
which is designed to diminish the plausibility of the claim of superiority a
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criminal legislation and sentencing, the polity makes a series of
social judgments that calibrate punishment according to the
gravity of the offense and the culpability of the offender. 4' The
polity presumably does not make such decisions lightly, but
there is no specifically retributivist contribution to the determination of what kind of behavior ought to be the subject of
criminal legislation. The subject of criminal legislation is one
that philosophers, economists, and judges42 dispute-whether it
should be limited to some understanding of John Stuart Mill's
harm principle, 4'3 for example-but it is not one in which retributivists have a stake as retributivists, though they undoubtedly should, and often do, engage the topic as thoughtful
citizens.
What induces retributive punishment is the offense against
the legal order.45 Where the law runs out, so must retribution.
criminal makes by his criminal action against his victim, fellow citizens, and
government. This point is developed further in Part II, infra.
41. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366-68 (1981). It
is true that these questions raise further questions: for example, how grave is
car theft relative to health care fraud? That we do not have clear a priori answers to some of these value assessments highlights the role of our democratic
institutions to help us come to some answer. It indicates that in the absence of
absolute confidence in our convictions about ranking of crimes we must recourse to positive law and a political conception of punishment.
42. See Oral Argument at 43, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)
(No. 02-102) Compare Justice Scalia's dissent, who argued that traditional
values may properly be reflected in criminal law, with Justice Breyer, who observed that a criminal prohibition on homosexual sodomy is as irrational as
the earlier American criminal prohibition of teaching German in schools.
43.

See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., F.S. Crofts

& Co. 1947) (1859).
44. For example, MOORE, supra note 24, develops a plausible and attractive account of criminal legislation, but the account's connection to retributivism qua justification for punishment is tenuous. A very useful discussion of
the proper scope of criminal legislation can be found in Larry Alexander, The
Philosophy of Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGAL THEORY 815 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). For varying accounts of the proper scope of criminal law, compare Meir Dan-Cohen,
Defending Dignity, in HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND
MORALITY 150, 150 (2002) (arguing that "the main goal of the criminal law is
to defend the unique moral worth of every human being"), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=331200, with SANFORD H. KADISH, The Crisis of
Overcriminalization, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW 21 (1987) (criticizing criminalization of victimless crimes).

45. By contrast, revenge may address slights, injuries, insults, or nonlegal
wrongs. Nozick notes additional distinctions between retribution and revenge:
retribution ends cycles of violence, whereas revenge fosters them; revenge is
personal, whereas retribution is impartially administered; no generality attaches to the avenger's interest, whereas retributivists seek to vindicate law's
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Where the law prohibits activity that you would rather not see
punished-or permits activity that you would like to see punished-your recourse is democratic agitation. Take it to Congress.46 That said, where the law punishes along dimensions
that are incompatible with retributivism's animating ideals,
there is room for argument on retributivist grounds. 7
B. MERCY, FORGIVENESS, AND DISCRETION

People often define mercy in various ways, and often what
passes for mercy is thought of as justice too. I will define mercy
in a more narrow way so that there can be a distinct difference
between reasons that serve to lessen punishment for purposes
of justice and reasons that lessen punishment for purposes of
mercy. In order to achieve some conceptual precision, I have
devised a table that will guide our discussion. Let us think of
"leniency" towards an offender as a value-free umbrella term
under which an offender receives less punishment than is possible. On one side of the table is what I will call equitable discretion (or justice). 8 This is when an offender receives less or
no punishment for reasons that are tied to the offender's choice
breaches; revenge has a particular emotional tone, whereas retribution is cool
and unemotional. See NOZICK, supra note 41, at 366-68. A few other distinctions may be noted: retribution is targeted at the offender, whereas revenge
may affect the offender's relatives; retribution is interested in the moral
autonomy and dignity of the offender, whereas revenge is indifferent (this affects whether and what kind of excuses might limit revenge); retribution seeks
the internalization of moral responsibility for lawful actions, whereas revenge
does not. See Dan Markel, Are Shaming PunishmentsBeautifully Retributive?
Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54
VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2216-17 (2001).
Some may cavil with this dichotomy between revenge and retribution. For
example, William Miller denies that retribution is cool and impartial relative
to revenge; he thinks retribution is motivated by emotions such as a sense of
duty and disapproval. See Miller, supra note 8, at 162-63. To the extent these
are emotions, they are reflective emotions, rather than impulsive ones. See
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Concepts of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1996). That they are reflective emotions
means that they are subject to greater malleability upon deliberation and dialogue.
46. This is not to say that anything legislatures do is permissible. The
boundaries of democratic action are properly demarcated by constitutionalism
rooted in fundamental liberal principles.
47. See Markel, supra note 45, at 2240-41 (arguing that punishments
that violate the animating premises of retributivism cannot be justified).
48. As I mentioned, I am using "leniency" in a value-neutral manner, although I recognize that mitigation in the service of justice may not seem lenient but rather a matter of right to which the alleged offender is entitled.
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to commit the crime, or to the severity of the crime itself. For
example, perhaps the offender develops evidence that he was
erroneously convicted or he had diminished capacity. On the
other side of the table is mercy. Mercy I define first as the remission of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the
offender's competence and ability to choose to engage in criminal conduct. We can call this first type of mercy "compassionbased" mercy.
LENIENCY
EQUITABLE DISCRETION
Excuses andJustifications;
Severity of Wrongdoing;

MERCY
Compassion

Identity

Anterior: minor age, insanity

Anterior: offender is poor or a war
veteran

Concurrent: duress, lesser evils
Posterior: erroneous conviction;
reduced social cost of crime due
to surrender, guilty plea, good
behavior

Concurrent: offender performed
illegal euthanasia
Posterior: offender experienced
religious conversion, heroism

Corruption/Caprice/Bias
Anterior: offender is friend of
President
Concurrent: offender commits crime
on Inauguration Day
Posterior: offender donates
substantially to President's campaign
This table summarizes two types of leniency and their potential subtypes,
as discussed in the text. Examples of each subtype are given. The designations "anterior," "concurrent," and "posterior" refer to the relationship
in time between the reason eliciting the leniency and the time that the offense occurred.
Let me provide a very rough typology of compassion-based
mercy. One might be merciful because of anterior reasons of
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human status: for example, the President decides to pardon all
offenders who are war veterans, or elderly, or new immigrants.
Under the appropriate circumstances, the fact that someone is
old or a veteran may be utterly irrelevant to the offender's decision to commit the crime. (As I mentioned above, I put aside
those instances where someone says that the factor eliciting
compassion is what necessitated their criminal action and treat
that possibility under the category of justice-enhancing or equitable discretion, under which various excuses and defenses are
recognized as mitigating or exculpating factors.) One might
also decide to be merciful because of a reason concurrent with
the offense; for example, the offender whose reckless driving
kills her best friend or child. Here it looks like the offender will
suffer more because of the nature of her crime and that evokes
sympathy and a desire to be somewhat merciful. Finally, some
might also like to extend mercy for reasons posterior to the offense: for example, the offender has a change of heart and repents, or the offender becomes ill or aged and will die in
prison.49
In part because of the historical associations between
mercy and grace and mercy and sovereign prerogative, I will
also define as mercy those grants of leniency that are motivated
by bias, corruption, or caprice-even though I recognize that
such a definition encompasses more types of leniency than colloquially used. 50 In the conception I am developing, mercy is
something that someone has neither a natural nor a legal right
to claim-it is bestowed upon the offender-perhaps like some
understandings of grace.51 Indeed, in the United States Su49. One can see on the table that there are analogues to equitable discretion, so context and judgment are vital. An anterior reason for justicecompatible leniency is that the offender is a minor. A concurrent reason for
justice-compatible leniency is the presence of duress or necessity. A posterior
reason for justice-enhancing leniency is that the state has scaled punishments
to the social cost of the wrongdoing, in which case it is appropriate to punish
less someone who earns good behavior credits during the period of his punishment.
50. As I mentioned, supra note 1, mercy has historically been associated
with leniency for these reasons as well.
51. In an article considering the motivations behind the use of executive
clemency, the author noted:
The feeling is that we should do as little as possible to grant relief....
It's a dangerous trend for the executive to override the function of the
courts and the parole system too much .... Clemency is bestowed as
an act of grace, not as a matter of right.
Kevin Krajick, The Quality of Mercy: The Methods of Deciding Who Receives
Clemency Often Have More To Do with Luck, Publicity or Politics Than with
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preme Court's early jurisprudence on the presidential pardoning power, Chief Justice John Marshall characterized the pardon as "an act of grace... which exempts the individual, on
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed." 2 This view is consistent with some
historical practices in which dispensations of mercy linked
grace with luck: the Romans, for example, released all criminals facing death sentences if they encountered a vestal virgin
en route to their execution, so long as the encounter was by
chance.5 3 While fortune's good grace sometimes dispenses
mercy, it is more often motivated by compassion. Compassion,
unlike fortune, can be instigated by plucking sentimental
strings that are quite predictable. 4 What is important about
these other reasons for mercy is that, like compassion, they are
granted for reasons unrelated to the offender's competence or
autonomy, or the severity of the offense.55 Again, these forms of
mercy should be distinguished from leniency that is motivated
by other reasons that are more properly viewed as triggering
equitable or justice-enhancing discretion.56
Justice, CORRECTIONS MAG., June 1979, at 46, 48 (quoting Raymond Theim,
Deputy United States pardon attorney); cf. Bush Pardons $11 Thief and a
Moonshine Seller, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2002, at A20 (reporting President
George W. Bush's grant of only seven pardons for petty criminals).
52. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). Later, Justice Holmes repudiated this conception of the pardon, rooting the pardon not
in the magisterial nature of the Presidency, but as an articulated "part of the
Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed." Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
53. See Kobil, supra note 22, at 585 n.87 ("[I]f in their walks they chance
to meet a criminal on his way to execution, it saves his life, upon oath made
that the meeting was an accidental one, and not concerted or of set purpose."
(quoting 1 PLUTARCH, Numa Pompilius, in THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE
GRECIANS AND ROMANS 74, 83 (John Dryden trans., Arthur Hugh Clough ed.,
1979))).
54. See supra text accompanying note 49.
55. Capricious or arbitrary leniency is rarely defended except in cases of
political theatre, where the sovereign affirms its power through grants of ostensibly magnanimous behavior. (I discuss whether the theatrical use of mercy
can be rendered compatible with democracy in Part III, infra.) As to bias, I refer to leniency afforded, either consciously or unconsciously, to offenders by
those judicial or executive agents who share (or otherwise favor those with)
some morally arbitrary characteristic of the offender.
56. Kobil usefully distinguished clemency that was used for justiceenhancing, justice-neutral, and justice-defeating purposes. See Kobil, supra
note 22, at 579-80. Justice-enhancing purposes include ensuring horizontal
and vertical equity among offenders or clearing the record of the erroneously
convicted. Justice-neutral purposes include facilitating social reconciliation
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Mercy, like other forms of leniency, can appear throughout
the life cycle of a crime. Mercy is possible whenever an officer
encounters suspicious activity and decides whether to turn
away. Prosecutors can be merciful in deciding to decline bringing charges, 5' or in deciding which charges to bring, and what
plea bargain to offer. Judges can-though they frequently do
not-direct acquittals or sentence below the range of the guidelines for merciful reasons. Similarly, grand jurors can resist a
prosecutor's desire to indict someone (though they are not informed of this power)," and petit jurors can give a verdict of not

after fissures in the national fabric (the pardon of Nixon was alleged to be an
instance of this purpose). One can imagine extreme circumstances that a society faces in which it must undertake tragic choices between competing moral
priorities that might be deemed "justice-neutral." See Jonathan Allen, Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 315, 320 (1999); see also
WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 181 (discussing American use of the political pardon after times of war or rebellion). One can also imagine that some types of
leniency are harder to categorize: What happens, for instance, when mass pardons are given merely to relieve overcrowding of prisons? Is this justiceneutral, justice-defeating, or even justice-enhancing? I can imagine arguments
for a variety of positions. In any case, Kobil argues that the use of justiceneutral leniency is something that should be limited to executive branch figures who can be held accountable through elections. Kobil, supra note 22, at
636-38 (proposing procedures for keeping the use ofjustice-neutral leniency in
check). Though this proposal is promising, it does not really address situations
when the executive branch may decide to exercise its powers when there is no
political check available, for example the last day of office. For now, I leave
aside these justice-neutral exercises of discretion.
57. The scope of prosecutorial declinations is often underappreciated. To
give one example, for the fiscal year 1976, the federal government declined to
prosecute 108,000 out of the 171,000 criminal matters that were referred to
the federal prosecutorial force. To be sure, these declinations occur for a wide
variety of reasons, including determinations based on the merits and relative
scarcity of resources. But out of 108,000 declinations, one must wonder how
many were products of prosecutorial compassion, bias, favoritism, and indeed
even caprice. The numbers seem even more likely to climb when counting the
.uncounted declinations" that are made by investigative agencies. See MARC L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,
AND ExEcuTivE MATERIALS 805 (2d ed. 2003) (quoting the statement of Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann before the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also id. at 808 (stating that in 1999, federal prosecutors filed charges
in sixty percent of the criminal matters referred to them, but that this number
was low because it did not include minor matters that took less than an hour
of a prosecutor's time and citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1999 table 2.2 NCJ-16179

(Apr. 2001)).
58. See United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2002);
see also Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2002) (advocating
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guilty despite overwhelming evidence of guilt.5 9 Governors or
Presidents may authorize pardons, amnesties, commutations,
remissions of fines, and reprieves. 0 This Article focuses chiefly
on those sites for mercy that are largely, if not totally, unreviewable: executive pardons, jury acquittals, and prosecutorial
declinations.
Note, then, what mercy is not: it is not forgiveness. The two
are distinct.6 Mercy is an act, whereas forgiveness is an attitude.62 That is, mercy contains a publicly observable aspect that
is distinct from forgiveness: mercy could be granted without
any change in the grantor's feeling toward the wrongdoer. Conversely, as Murphy has noted, one can forgive someone, even
oneself, but still wish for him to experience the full extent of
punishment. Forgiveness needs no observable action.63
Note again that mercy must be kept distinct from what I
will call (equitable) discretion, if the distinction between retributive justice and mercy is to retain any significance.6 4 If
a robust role for grand juries).
59. See Horning v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138-39 (1920) ("[TIhe
jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts.");
Butler, supra note 16, at 680 ("Racial considerations by African-American jurors are legally and morally right.").
60. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 11.
61. Mercy and forgiveness are often conflated. See, e.g., ANDRE COMPTESPONVILLE, A SHORT TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES 118 (Catherine Temerson trans., William Heinemann 2002) (1996) ("Mercy... is the virtue of
forgiveness .... ."); Misner, supra note 16, at 1359 ("Mercy requires a particular attitude."). The relationship between mercy and clemency is also worth exploring. In this Article, clemency refers to a reduction in punishment once the
punishment has already been determined. See Rapaport, supra note 16, at
1503 ("Clemency... denote[s] only relief granted after the punishment is initially determined."). That clemency may be merciful insofar as it is motivated
by compassion, caprice, or bias. Or, it might simply be leniency afforded as a
function of justice-guided discretion.
As Rapaport notes, clemency can take different forms. See id. at 1505.
Clemency can be the commutation of a sentence, a pardon for an offense, or
the restoration of rights forfeited during the penal sentence. Id. It can attach
to classes of persons (amnesties) or particular persons. Id. Amnesties, however, can also occur before any determination of culpability. Clemency can also
be manifested merely in a reprieve, which delays the sentence or the remission
of fines. Id.
62. MOORE, supra note 22, at 188.
63. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 29, at 14.
64. In a well-known essay, Martha Nussbaum traced the development of
mercy as the consequence of an equitable attention to the particular details of
an offender's background. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Equity and Mercy, in
SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 154, 154-83 (1999). But this attention to detail is in no
way fundamentally at odds with retributive goals of sentencing in accordance
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mercy, understood as leniency afforded on "justice-defeating"
grounds such as compassion, caprice, or bias, were to overlap
with discretion, that is, leniency afforded for justice-enhancing
reasons, then it would be hard to differentiate mercy from retributive justice. This may seem semantically controversial, because many people run "just"and "merciful" together, but it is
necessary to distinguish them if we want to form an argument
about the concepts. As I suggested earlier, there are numerous
reasons for which findings of no culpability or reduced culpability are desirable on retributivist grounds-for example, diminished capacity, special circumstances including necessity or coercion, or new evidence affecting guilt determinations. These
findings require the use of justice-enhancing discretion, that is,
judgments based on articulable standards of desert in relation
to culpability and the severity of the offense. 5
Retributive theory seeks to cabin sites for leniency (such as
the executive pardon) so that these sites are not used for justice-defeating purposes. Because retributive justice seeks to
punish an offender because she deserves to be punished in a
manner commensurate to her legal wrongdoing and responsibility, an institutional design that creates discretionary spaces
for the purpose of individuated justice is necessary to assure
that someone is getting what she deserves. Not more, not less.
And because retributive punishment is predicated on the use of
individuated adjudication, mercy's ambit thus contracts (relative to popular understandings). It is useful, then, to identify
those reasons for leniency that are often lumped under mercy
when they should instead be categorized as reasons for justice.
What is left for mercy is admittedly smaller than is commonly
with desert. See A.T. Nuyen, Straining the Quality of Mercy, 23 PHIL. PAPERS
61, 63-67 (1994) (criticizing Nussbaum's argument for equity as failing to dis-

tinguish it from justice). The background of the offender may be relevant to
determining whether the offender's decision to commit the crime was freely
undertaken or subject to some diminished capacity. See Carol S. Steiker, Tem-

pering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice 10
(Apr. 12-13, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[U]nder
this skeptical view of mercy, justice embraces a piece, perhaps a very large
one, of what in common parlance goes by the name of mercy."). These views
were noted long ago in St. Anselm's writings. See ST. ANSELM, PROSLOGION,
125, 127, 129 (M.J. Charlesworth trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (observing
that mercy appears to be an injustice since it means punishing less than de-

served, but that many factors that call for mercy actually affect the distribution of punishment, and therefore mercy is a redundancy).
65. As noted earlier, discretion to extend leniency may also result from
justice-neutral considerations that are similarly not the product of compassion, caprice, or bias. See supra note 56.
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referenced,
but it is by no means a trivial amount or a null
66
set.
The goal of this Article, then, is to see what is wrong with
mercy, that is, leniency granted out of compassion, bias, corruption, or caprice. It is important to emphasize the constraints
I have put on these definitions because there would be little
point in discussing the tension between justice and mercy if
they overlapped. So let me reiterate: the giving of mercy is not
something that can be tied to desert if mercy is to have any
meaning distinct from what justice requires or permits.
I also want to clarify a related point. That retributive justice justifies punishment under ordinary circumstances does
not mean that punishment ought to be imposed under all circumstances. Retributivists can and should recognize that retributive justice is not the only value that makes life worth living, and that there are times when the suspension of
retributive justice may be necessary. 6 This is consistent with
retributivism's animating moral ideals because, far from being
unconcerned with consequences, retributivists urge on offenders the maxim that they must take responsibility for the rea-

66. This restrictive definition of mercy is nothing new among those who
have written on the subject. See Misner, supra note 16, at 1361 ("[M]any
scholars conclude that justice and mercy indeed are inconsistent concepts, at
least as to public justice and public mercy."); see also Ross Harrison, The
Equality of Mercy, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 107, 121 (Hyman

Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992); MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 27, at
162, 164; H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352, 353 (1971) ("A genuine act of

mercy is always unjustified .... ."). That said, the point about providing the
typology of reasons for compassion-based mercy, see supra text accompanying
note 49, is to show that even defined narrowly, mercy is not a null set.
67. I reiterate the point that, even defined narrowly and apart from desert, mercy is embraced or celebrated by those who think that compassion for
the offender, manifested in mercy, should trump retribution. See, e.g., supra
note 16. My argument is also addressed to those who would embrace changes
that likely will increase the incidence of bias and prejudice in criminal sentencing, for example, Barkow and Iontcheva, supra note 19, as well as to others who attempted to justify greater leniency, on retributivist grounds, such as
those who have suffered enough or suffered disproportionately to their offense,
for example, MOORE and Kobil, supra note 22. To the latter group, this Article
argues that they misunderstand the ideas behind retribution and therefore
misapply those ideas to sentencing issues.
68. I have in mind, as one example, cases of supreme emergency in which
the project of retributive justice and all other good projects are endangered. Cf
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 251-55 (1977) (discussing supreme emergency); Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of
Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389 (1999) (arguing
that an attractive retributivism is ultimately consequentialist).
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sonably foreseeable results of their actions. That same maxim
cannot be abrogated when retributivists are designing systems
of justice or advocating reforms therein. s
C. THE THREE QUESTIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW

With these notions in mind, turn now to the structure of
the philosophy of criminal law, where most interesting questions fit into three broad areas of inquiry. First, what types of
acts or omissions should be the object of criminal legislation?7 °
69. That is why, for example, the call to compassion from retributivism's
critics must be assessed critically: Compassion runs in many directions, and
the sense of compassion in the system builder must extend not only to the offender, but also to the future victims of undeterred crime, the potentially innocent people swept up in an error-prone criminal justice system, and the taxpayers who must fund the entire system, warts and all. It goes without saying
that many of these concerns will resonate with those who view the criminal
justice system through welfarist lenses as well. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 32.
70. This question is vital, as promiscuous use of criminal sanctions creates greater risk of error and abuse by authorities. The modern state punishes
more than just the usual array of force or fraud. In the United States, more
than 300,000 federal regulations are said to be sanctioned by criminal penalties. Take two examples that are favorites of law professors: the environmental regulation that criminalizes the disturbance of mud in a cave on federal lands, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4302(1), 4302(5), 4306 (a)(1), 4306(b) (2000), and the
Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508 §§ 209,
221, 84 Stat. 1114, 1121-22 (1970), which criminalizes the failure of a financial institution to file a report for bank transactions of $10,000 or more. See
generally Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 959, 963 (2000).
Husak raises a concern germane to the legal conception of retribution in
this paper. He worries that the array of activities subject to criminalization far
exceeds the array of activities that are "essentially concerned with wrongdoing
and blame." Id. at 966. Because of our bloviated codes, "no theory about the
function of the criminal law will closely fit existing practice." Id. at 966-67.
Insofar as the "function of the criminal law" can be equated with the justification for a criminal penalty, I think Husak errs. As we will see in the text that
follows, the account I offer justifies the imposition of punishment on activities
that have been denominated as criminal with little regard for their actual content. Subject to the boundaries delimited by basic "background rights," which
create and preserve a moral space in which one can act without interference
from the state or from others, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003), it is enough for legislatures to decide that a certain activity is subject
to criminal sanction for the law to merit our compliance and for our disobedience to be punished. If the legislature acts within those boundaries, then to
flout legislative will becomes wrongful simpliciter. While this approach may
justify punishment for activities that Husak does not think should be punished, there is nothing implausible about it. See Husak, supra, at 967. In
short, the connection between a legislative directive and punishing wrongdoing is tighter than Husak apparently believes. (One might argue that Husak's
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Second, what justifies the role of the state, and not some other
actor, in imposing punishment against an offender of legal
norms? Third, if punishment is warranted, what framework is
appropriate to determine how much and what kind of hard
treatment should be inflicted upon an offender? These issues
may be thought of as legislation, punishment, and sentencing.
The first question is relatively unimportant right now, but
it will come up in Part IV when the public choice problem associated with the politics of criminal law is discussed. The latter
two are of immediate significance, as shown in the next section.
For if the justification for punishment permits no deviation or
relief from sentencing, then the question of how much punishment should be inflicted is obviously implicated.71
Turning to the justification question, note that philosophers of punishment traditionally offer four justifications for
punishment: deterrence of future wrongful actions by either the
offender or the general population, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. This Article focuses on the last purpose,
retribution, by discussing a theory that I call the confrontational conception of retribution, or the CCR. The argument I
make, therefore, does not preclude a role for mercy if punishment is justified along lines other than retributive justice. 2

conception of background rights is considerably more capacious than mine,
and that is where our disagreement lies. But consider whether his apparent
scorn for currency control or environmental legislation is compatible with reasonable conceptions of natural or background rights.) For the distinction between background or natural rights on the one hand, and legal or institutional
rights on the other hand, see Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor's Guide to
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 655, 670-71
(1997) (glossing on RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 93 (1977)).
71. Although the second and third questions are analytically distinct,
there is a connection: Any time a justification for punishment is offered, it will
always have at least some implications for the quantum as well as the kind of
punishment inflicted on an offender. For example, if someone thinks punishment is justified by virtue of specific deterrence alone, he might not punish
someone who, after he has committed a crime, becomes so severely disabled
that he would be unable to commit another crime later. I have explored this
connection between punishment and sentencing elsewhere. Markel, supra note
45, at 2215-40 (explaining how a retributivist justification of punishment
counsels against the use of shaming punishments, but in favor, for the most
part, of guilt punishments or private prisons).
72. From here on, I will often conflate punishment with retribution, and
retribution with my particular conception of it.
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II. THE CONFRONTATIONAL CONCEPTION
OF RETRIBUTION
Retribution is often characterized as being concerned with
the offender's past wrongdoing. 3 Responding to this infraction,
retribution endorses the infliction of hard treatment on an offender because he deserves it. As to the level of punishment, we
say it should be commensurate to the seriousness of the wrong
and his blameworthiness in committing it.
Though widely held, this typical account does not explain
why the state, rather than the victim or her allies, is the punitive agent. It also fails to unpack the claim that an offender deserves something: by virtue of what can it be said that he deserves this stigmatic, harsh treatment? In other words, the
intuition behind desert requires elaboration because, frankly,
not everyone will agree with the claim that the state should
punish Jim because Jim committed wrongdoing. Others may
not even accept, on its face, the more elemental claim that Jim
deserves punishment. Instead, they might advocate some form
of treatment. As a result, we need to flesh out the idea of desert.
The confrontational conception of retribution, or CCR,
identifies the idea of desert as a placeholder for three other
principles that have broader acceptance as specifically-though
not necessarily only-political ideals: moral accountability for
unlawful actions, equal liberty under law, and democratic selfdefense.74
The first point is that retribution instantiates, as and in a
socio-legal practice, the ideal of individual moral responsibility.
When we punish an offender who knows, or reasonably should
have known, that it was illegal to have stolen, raped, or murdered, we tell him that his actions matter to this community
constituted by shared laws. To illustrate, imagine that I physically attacked my neighbor. If the state, in its ordinary course
of business, knowingly did nothing in the face of my crime, its
inaction could be read to express two social facts: first, an indifference to the legal rights of its citizens, particularly to the security of their persons and property; and second, a statement to
73. See the definition offered by Rawls, supra note 39, at 4-5.
74. It is not my intention here to explain in great detail where this account of retribution draws upon and departs from previous accounts, but
rather I seek here to apply the account to the problem of mercy. For purposes
of this Article, then, one should discount attempts to ascribe or claim originality regarding the account of retribution.
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me that my actions will not be taken seriously by the state.75
When the state makes an effort to punish me for my crime, by
contrast, it tells me that I will be held accountable for my
unlawful actions. In this way, the attempt at punishment
communicates the ideal of moral accountability for unlawful actions.
It bears mentioning that the attempt at punishment seems
sufficient to communicate this norm, and yet punishment itself
may not be necessary to communicate the point. When the
state credibly threatens to use coercion, through the institution
of retributive practices, that is sufficient to communicate the
norm that our actions and our interests matter to the state. (If
we insisted that the state actually achieve complete enforcement and punishment, then we would almost certainly be in
the untenable position of spending our every and last unit of
collective resources on criminal justice.) Relatedly, we might
envision an offender who, immediately after committing his
crime, came forward, accepted responsibility, and evidenced his
awareness of this ideal through his own process of repentance.
So something else is at stake when we say that coercion should
be used even if the first ideal has been internalized by the offender.
This leads to the second justification, that punishment as
retribution effectuates the principle of equal liberty under law.
In a liberal democracy, punishment serves under equality's
flag. When I steal, rape, or murder, I am arrogating a license to
act in ways that the polity has officially proscribed. I lord this
license over my victim and those around me. It is a claim of su-

75. These statements, however, are contingent upon several important
factors affecting the determination of the offender's culpability. For instance,
did the offender have knowledge of what he was doing? Did he know or should
he have known, according to some objective test of reasonableness, that his
actions were unlawful? Could he conform his behavior to that legal standard?
E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). If the answer is yes, the offender
has satisfied the competence criterion. Second, culpability is also shaped by
whether the action was excused or justified under the particular circumstances. Self-defense, duress, or necessity may have actuated the offense, or
provocation may mitigate its severity. E.g., id. §§ 2.09, 3.02, 3.04. Call this the
context criterion. For some people, the context criterion is quite capacious, and
includes rotten social backgrounds (RSBs) as an excuse. To my mind, a RSB,
or other factors that evoke compassion, can only be considered if there is
strong evidence of a causal connection between the choice to commit the crime
and the feature that elicits compassion. But see MOORE, supra note 22, at 167
(advocating leniency for offenders whose personal characteristics are not necessarily related to their role in crime, such as advanced age).
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periority-namely, that I am a law unto myself, that society's
laws do not bind me. 6 On this view, it does not matter that not
everyone, if given the chance, would similarly seek to steal,
rape, or murder.7 All that matters is that I am defecting from a
legal order to which I have good reason to give my allegiance,
and I am defecting in such a way that I am taking license to

which others are not entitled.

If no attempt is made to punish

me, my claim to superiority over others commands greater
plausibility than it would if I were made to experience some
level of coercion that is not inflicted on nonoffending fellow citi79
zens.
When a person is aware of the credible threat of the state's
intent to impose some level of hard treatment that would otherwise not be inflicted, the state is giving its best reasonable efforts to reduce the plausibility of a false claim to superiority.
The coercive measures communicate the norm of equal liberty
under law and they are directed to the offender, the person

76. Some might argue that the ubiquity of claims of superiority in society
undermines the claim that crime, unlike other actions, is a claim of superiority
that merits special attention. But this misses the point: Crime is a species of
the genus of claims of superiority, and it gets particular attention because we
have agreed, through our democratic institutions, to give it that attention.
Husak, for example, suggests that when someone wrongs me in a way that is
not criminally sanctioned, she also deserves some punishment, or absent
state-imposed punishment, some degree of suffering. See Husak, supra note
69, at 971-72. This confuses things. There is an array of wrongs, slights, or
inconveniences people may impose. Not all of them merit criminal sanctions
simply because it might not be feasible to expend scarce social resources upon
prosecuting all of them. There are nonlegal but still permissible sanctions that
can be inflicted upon people who commit these noncriminal wrongs: for example, reputational retaliation, gossip, avoidance, competition. Some or all of
these responses may also communicate the norm of moral accountability, but
these responses are not limited, as retribution is, to the ambit of punishing
legislatively proscribed behavior.
77. In this way, we sidestep the problems accompanying Herbert Morris's
well-known "anti-free-riding" account of retribution. Herbert Morris, Persons
and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 77 (Stanley E. Grupp ed.,
1971).
78. I table for now the question of what characteristics make a legal order
to which I have good reason to give my allegiance. The question is addressed
largely in the literature of political legitimacy. Classics in that literature are
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom trans., 1968); THOMAS HOBBES,

LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651); and, more
recently, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
79. One might wonder how an offender's repentance affects the analysis.
My sense is that an offender's repentance, if it is to be credited among the public, must include willingness to endure some hard treatment to evidence his
own repentance to his fellow citizens.
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most in need of hearing it.8 ° Being the target of coercion reduces
the plausibility of a claim to superiority.81
The reasons mentioned so far, however, do not explain why
the state should be the institution that punishes. I have explained only why an offender's action deserves reprobative
treatment by dint of the wrongdoing. Accordingly, the third
good that justifies retribution is the achievement of a form of
democratic self-defense. Recall the claim of superiority made by
an offender's action against his victim. That claim of superiority, however implicit, is not merely a claim against his victim; it
is also an active rebellion against the political order of equal
liberty under law. Each time an offense occurs, the offender is
trying to shift where the rules of property, liability, and inalienability lie; 82 in doing so, the criminal is revolting against
the democratic determinations of where those rules lie.83 He is
80. This rationale-that punishment is defending equal liberty under
law-is inspired in part from Jean Hampton and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, but it offers its own permutations. Whereas Hampton's work defended
a nonpolitical account of retribution that was victim focused, see Jean Hampton, CorrectingHarms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1659-1702 (1992), and Hegel's work in PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT is metaphysically encumbered, see GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1820), the

account I offer here seems a bit more straightforward and is capacious enough
to include "victimless" crimes that are legislated as a product of democratic
deliberation. For a trenchant overview of deliberative democracy, see ETHAN J.
LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2004).

81. The idea of punishment reducing the plausibility of the claim of superiority over the victim is from a chapter written by Jean Hampton, entitled
"The Retributive Idea," in MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 27, at 111-61. By
taking a victim-centered approach, Hampton failed, to my mind, to see the social implications of the claim to superiority in criminal actions and missed the
institutional dimension of equal liberty under law.
82. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972) (discussing when entitlement should be protected under property, liability, or inalienability rules).
83. For example, possession of cocaine is currently illegal and may lead to
imprisonment. If tomorrow the legislature prospectively permitted cocaine
possession, that legislative change would not be a justification for setting free
those who are currently in prison for cocaine possession. However, if a state
had a wicked legal regime or a discrete set of wicked legal practices, then setting free those convicted under wicked laws would be justified following a reform of the regime or its practices. One sees, therefore, that the outer limits of
what retributivism permits are marked by liberalism's boundaries regarding
the substance of the criminal law, and in some cases, its procedures. (I recognize that not everyone would accept that the externalities of cocaine possession are sufficient to justify criminal sanctions, but that is a topic for another
day.)
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usurping the sovereign will of the people by challenging their
decision-making structure.84
Hence, the offense is not merely against the victim but also
against the people and their agent, the state, whose charter
mandates the protection not only of the persons constituting
the political order, but also of the decision-making authority of
the regime itself. That is why, for example, federal officers
swear an oath to protect the Constitution of these United
States against its enemies. 85 It is an oath to protect the decision-making structure of the nation. That these officers swear
the oath illuminates the idea that when defending the Constitution, one is defending it against attack from those who shift
the rules unlawfully-these shifts reveal crimes as, to a greater
or lesser degree, political rebellions.8 6 Of course, not all crimes
84. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
124 (1990). This justification is sometimes challenged by those who, like
Husak, view the criminal law chiefly as an instrument to vindicate the suffering of the victim with the suffering of the offender. See Husak, supra note 69,
at 973. Thus, victimless crimes are less of a concern and therefore less likely to
require punishment. The problem is that such an account provides no reason
to discount the rights and interests of collective bodies. Husak's sufferingfocused account also mistakenly concludes by implication, if not directly, that
all suffering is the same in quality, even if not in quantity. Surely the hardship one endures from imprisonment is different from the hardship caused by
the loss of a child or the pain of a paper cut. Husak's argument, which was developed in a more qualified form by MOORE, supra note 22, at 173, suggests
that as long as the suffering is "equivalent," the "intuitions" of retributive justice would be satisfied. See Husak, supra note 69, at 970. Once one realizes the
variegated nature of suffering and its multiple social meanings, one realizes
the deficiencies of this claim.
85. State judges and many other nonfederal officers take similar oaths.
86. The doctrines of duress or necessity might excuse or justify actions
that otherwise look criminal. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02 (1962).
And indeed, in some unjust societies, or with respect to some unjust practices,
some rebellions should succeed; that critique, however, is basically one against
legislation, not punishment. For the ordinary case of malum in se crimes, or
crimes that are reasonably malum prohibitum, it is important to see one's
criminal actions as an expression of defiance against the decision-making regime and the people who make the decisions developed in presumptively legitimate constitutional regimes. It is rarely the case that this is one's specific
intent, but it is a reasonable reading of an offender's actions. To the extent
that we want to see certain excuses or defenses available in criminal law that
mitigate or thwart punishment precisely because we do not believe that under
the circumstances they can plausibly be read as rebellions against the political
order, we have that opportunity-through democratic action, including delegation to judges of the obligation to exercise sentencing discretion within guidelines. Cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (discussing the constitutionality of congressional authorization of sentencing commissions and
guidelines). For a fascinating discussion of judicial confinement and innova-
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look like rebellions and not all rebellions need be quashed with
maximal use of resources. Quite to the contrary, the scarcity of
social resources in a society committed to pursuing various projects of moral significance requires a principle of frugal proportionality in punishment." Previous accounts of retributivism
have had difficulty explaining what proportionality is and why
it is relevant to the justification of punishment.8 8 On the account provided here, one can see how concern for the wise allocation of social resources would lead a legislator to endorse sentences commensurate to the severity of the social cost of the
crime but neither more nor less under normal circumstances.89
Because retribution instantiates these widely accepted and
attractive principles of moral accountability for unlawful actions, equal liberty under law, and democratic self-defense, the
practice of retribution has an internally intelligible character.
It is a practice that, generally speaking, can be justified independent of the contingent benefits it might generate, such as
specific or general deterrence.9"
Before examining the implications of this rationale for
mercy, I want to emphasize that this account is a legal conception of retribution, one that characterizes a criminal offense as
tion in the world created by the federal sentencing guidelines, see Berthoff v.
United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D. Mass. 2001), in which a court reluctantly denied habeas corpus relief for a defendant sentenced under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and excoriated the prosecutors' office for its hidden
practice of fact bargaining.
87. The practice of retribution is only one attractive social practice among
many. Every person interested in social planning has to realize that, on the
margins, resources spent on the project of retributive justice are resources not
spent on feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, and healing the sick.
Moreover, the practice of retribution poses significant nonpecuniary risks: especially error and abuse by authorities. Hence, it is a practice that can be
commended only when all reasonable measures are taken to reduce those
risks.
88. See Rubin, supra note 32 (criticizing the assumption that retributivism and proportionality are necessarily linked).
89. The account in the text not only limns the often obscured connection
between the proportionality principle and retributive justice, it shows, through
its linkage with the principle of frugality, see JEREMY BENTHAM,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION Ch. XV
(1789), a well of conceptual resources to draw upon in challenging grossly disproportionate sentences. A legislator alert to this rationale keeps it in mind
when drafting or delegating the creation of a sentencing guideline structure.
90. But as indicated earlier, just because something is internally justifiable does not make it required in all circumstances. And as indicated in note
87, supra, because of its costs and the dangers of error and abuse, the practice
of retribution must be conducted in a manner mindful of those costs and risks.
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a breach of legitimate legal norms within legitimate regimes.
The literature sometimes distinguishes this conception of punishment from moral retributivism, which focuses on giving
someone what he "really deserves" independent of the law. 91
Accordingly, I want to wave a few cautionary flags about moral
retributivism.92
First, the moral (or nonpolitical) conception of retribution
really embraces something closer, if not identical, to revenge,
inasmuch as its justification of retaliation does not require the
state's existence. Unlike the confrontational conception of retribution, moral retributivism cannot provide an internally coherent reason why the state should be an agent of punishment,
let alone the exclusive one. Some defenders of moral retributivism might downplay this failure, insisting that the marginalization or exclusion of the state in punishment means little. But
by minimizing the role of the state, these critics must then defend the awkward position of being against impartiality in the
administration of punishment. Or they must explain how they
will achieve impartiality in the absence of the state.93
A second concern is the scope of what the moral retributivist seeks to punish. Moral retributivism necessarily expands
beyond law's orb, covering all morally suspect behavior. This
aspiration makes the great the enemy of the good.94 It also risks
fostering a passion for punishment so strong that limitless retributive energy consumption would deplete social resources
from the demands of other moral projects, such as the provision
91. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 56-58 (1970)
(drawing the distinction between pre-institutional desert and legal entitlement); 1 JOEL FEINBERG, MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS
(1984) (same); GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987) (defending moral retributivism);
Christopher, supra note 32, at 885-87 (offering a stylized distinction between
the two types of retributivism).
92. See also Guyora Binder's fine essay, supra note 25.
93. See supra note 45 (discussing distinctions between retribution and revenge). It is possible, of course, that moral retributivists are prepared to invite
the state to participate, but such an invitation occurs on grounds entirely alien
to their own conception; that is, it serves as a pragmatic concession rather
than as an idea organic to their views about punishment and desert. Alternatively, impartiality could be achieved by outsourcing either adjudication or
punishment or both to third parties; but then a question of legitimacy in pluralistic societies arises, which requires the state to reenter the situation. See
Markel, supra note 45 (discussing the reasons why the state's presence is a
desideratum for purposes of punishment).
94. Cf. PLATO, supra note 78 (dramatizing the tension between ideal political institutional overhaul and moderate incremental political reform).

1452

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1421

of education, hunger relief, health care, and shelter.95 The legal
retributivist is less imperialistic precisely because what someone "deserves" is a function of clear breaches of politically denominated guidelines for behavior.
On the flip side, legal retributivists are able to give voice to
self-government in a way that seems unavailable to moral retributivists. Simply put, a moral retributivist lacks the conceptual resources to justify punishing conduct that would be
malum prohibitum.9 6 The federal law punishing the "disturbance of mud" in caves on federal lands, for example, seems
laughable to the moral retributivist because it does not on its
face suggest that there is anything morally blameworthy to
punish. By contrast, under the CCR, one is not beholden to a
fixed understanding of what social priorities the state must advance through the criminal law. What is right or good can be
realized through self-government.9 7
Of course, to be committed to legal retributivism does not
mean that all is morally permitted so long as it has a democratic pedigree. The argument I offer begins from a fixed point
asserting respect for the free and equal nature of persons and
the concomitant responsibility of designing legal institutions
that confer equal liberty to persons before and under the law.
Within that general framework, however, legal retributivism is
embraced, such that the terms of positive law govern insofar as

95. St. Thomas Aquinas, in asking "whether it belongs to human law to
repress all vices," recognized the limits of human law:
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not
forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more
grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain;
and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human
law prohibits murder, theft and such-like.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, Question 96, art. 2 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
96. One can try, as Chad Flanders has urged on me, to erase the dichotomy I have suggested by imagining a moral retributivism that confers this rebuttable presumption of obligation to laws passed in a constitutional democracy, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 9 (1977), and
comparing that with the conception of legal retributivism constrained by liberalism that I have suggested in the text. This does some work in dissolving
the tension, but I think not enough, for a moral retributivist assumes the classic position of seeking punishment of wrongdoers independent of the state, and
the position taken by Flanders depends on the existence of the state, an encumbrance rejected by most pure moral retributivists.
97.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 68 (1993).
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they operate within liberalism's bandwidth. The subject of legislation (and therefore the object of retribution) may be influenced by moral judgments. But the key is that those judgments
be refracted through the processes that make those judgments
(liberal) laws and not mere opinions.
In sum, the rationale of the CCR explains-without recourse to mere intuitions or emotions of vengeance, resentment,
or hatred-why the state should punish the guilty and not punish the innocent.98 If we agree that these principles animate a
nobler image of retributive justice, we have to ask whether the
doctrines and the institutional practices we have developed are
consistent with these underlying principles. And this is where
mercy's troubles begin-at least in the context of law.
III. RETRIBUTION AND MERCY
A. THE RETRIBUTIVIST CRITIQUE OF MERCY

Consider first the following question: to whom does the
prerogative of granting mercy attach in a complex legal system? In private affairs, it is presumably the wronged person
who can waive whatever penalty might be owed him or her on
account of the offender's wrongdoing. But when a violation of
the criminal law occurs, the retributive rationale does not admit that crime is only against one person or even a discrete set
of individuals." Because of the democratic pedigree of criminal
laws in liberal democracies, crimes are expressions of superiority to the polity, not merely to the particular victim. That is
why, if the victim pleads for mercy toward the defendant, such
pleas should be given little or no weight.'0 0 In a normatively at98. The innocent have neither made any claims of legal superiority
through their actions nor have they usurped power from the decision-making
structure that they have good reason to obey ex ante.
99. See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor
Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 67 (1999) (taking the extreme position that
victims "should and must be ignored if you are claiming to be doing retributive
theory"). Moore goes too far: Victims can be included in various ways but they
need not be present or active in order for retributive goals to be realized. For
example, it does no wrong to retributive theory for the state to send a letter to
a victim to let her know that the trial or sentencing hearing will take place in
two weeks' time or, for that matter, to inform her that her aggressor is being
released from prison in two months. There is, in short, greater than realized
compatibility between retributive theory and the state's awareness and solicitousness of victims' interests.
100. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? Some Thoughts
About Survivor OpinionEvidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
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tractive polity, only the state's actors have standing to dispense
mercy and punishment.
But why grant mercy? At first blush, at least, acts of mercy
ultimately undermine each of the principles undergirding the
CCR-moral accountability, equal liberty under law, and democratic self-defense.
Consider first the moral accountability argument.T1 1 If I am
a disabled war veteran (or pregnant, or elderly) and one day I
attacked my neighbor because I did not like his dog barking at
my spouse, why should I not receive mercy? The argument
would be this: by not punishing me as we would punish others
for this crime, the neighbor's interests in personal security do
not matter in the same respect; moreover, we are saying to the
offender, we are not going to take your actions as being seriously the actions of a dignity-bearing autonomous moral agent.
Put differently, if the state did grant leniency because of that
compassion-evoking characteristic, in what way is the ideal of
moral accountability effectuated? If twin brothers commit the
same crime and the second receives leniency, would it not be
correct to say that only an act of grace benefited him? In secular terms, mustn't that disparate treatment be regarded as arbitrary and therefore to be minimized if not eliminated in the
liberal state? Wouldn't such mercy violate, at least in a prima
facie way, the right of citizens to see the state make a good
faith effort at punishing offenders in a proper and fitting manner?1°2
530 (2003) (arguing that evidence describing the victim and impact on the
survivor should usually be excluded from capital sentencing hearings). In
large measure due to the success of the victims' rights movement, many jurisdictions in the United States do permit some expression of the victim or her
family to enter into the consideration of the sentencer. To my mind this focus
is misplaced. It is one thing to ensure that victims can be informed of when
and where the system is confronting the offender; it is quite another thing,
and altogether unacceptable, for them to play a role in the outcome of the offender's sentencing. Giving victims a role can create dramatic disparities in
punishment that are based on things that are morally arbitrary. While well
intentioned, this result is fundamentally illiberal and antithetical to the basic
norms underlying retributivism. But cf Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991) (holding that the Constitution does not prohibit introduction of victim
impact statements during the penalty phase of a capital trial); Vander Pol, supra note 16, at 710-11 (2003) (advocating the introduction of statements urging leniency by families of murder victims).
101. This argument, recall, states that when the state makes an effort at
punishing me for my offense, it acknowledges my capacity for moral responsibility and it expresses fidelity and respect to the rights of its citizens.
102. This sensitivity probably explains some of the outrage with President
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Admittedly, I could imagine permitting leniency for a
whole host of other reasons: for example, that he operated under diminished capacity or his act was a choice of lesser evils.0 3
But these reasons stand apart from mercy; these situations offer reasons that are consistent with determinations of moral
culpability and responsibility in theories of retributive justice. 104
This concern about the role of mercy extends to the principle of equal liberty under law. If everyone is entitled to the
same package of liberties safeguarded by political and legal inClinton's last-minute pardons. The fact that Marc Rich had been powerfully
connected and wealthy created the stench of pardons for sale, a practice not
unknown in history. See MOORE, supra note 22, at 202 (discussing the practices of King James II and Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton in which pardons
were sold for personal enrichment).
103. Or, alternatively, that the offender came forward after the statutory
crime was committed and accepted responsibility before a trial was held; that
he cooperated substantially in prosecution of other crimes; that he independently made restitution for the theft; or that he was a model of good behavior in
prison. Postconviction actions can be susceptible to analyses of retributive desert if we view, as I think we should, the severity of an offender's actions as
encompassing the social cost of his conduct. Someone who comports himself
well in prison imposes a smaller social cost than someone who does not, and
the legislature ought to scale the punishment to the gravity of the social cost
of the crime to the extent possible. Hence the offense includes both the statutory trigger and the presence of certain legislatively denominated conduct after the statutory trigger. Nonetheless, this is a point that has not been well
understood in the literature. See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 16, at 1518 (characterizing retributivists as committed to the idea that "[all information relevant to just desert is at least in principle available at the time of sentencing.
While errors that were not avoided at the time of sentencing ought later to be
corrected, nothing the offender does after sentencing is relevant to a clemency
decision.").
104. The more helpful the criminals are, and the earlier they render their
help, the less manifest their rebellion against the regime is. The same sensibility can be reflected in a legislature's decision to give shorter sentences to those
who behave better in prison. Being a retributivist does not entail a commitment to ignore all postconviction information that does not affect the accuracy
of the conviction. For example, exculpatory evidence is something retributivists pay attention to postconviction. Other issues may be of similar importance. For example, what if an offender unwittingly swallowed a pill that
erased his entire memory of the crime? On the CCR's view, there would be no
point to his punishment qua retributive punishment. (Whether he ought to be
detained and/or treated in different facilities because he remains a danger to
society should be determined in a civil confinement proceeding. Cf Kansas v.
Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 410-15 (2002) (upholding state civil detention for statutory sexual predators who lack sufficient behavioral self-control, as proven by
the state); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding state civil
detention for statutory sexual predators). By contrast, the person who swallowed such a pill purposefully could arguably be punished.
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stitutions, it is hard to see how granting mercy to some offenders but not to others effectuates this ideal. This might not be
the case if there were nonarbitrary reasons why we granted leniency, such as the ones I mentioned earlier. But then the leniency becomes tied to desert, broadly understood, and is therefore not mercy but rather the exercise of equitable or justiceenhancing discretion.
Finally, mercy stands at odds with the nature of the modern liberal democratic regime under rule of law. Recall the
third justification for retribution: the polity's self-defense
against the offender's usurpation of political power. The criminal's action, because it is a criminal action, can plausibly be
read as contemptuous of a structure of reasonable powersharing and decision-making modules; hence, his action is undeserving of mercy. To grant mercy to an offender would undermine a basic norm of reciprocity and fair dealing. That is
not to say that our political institutions should not exhibit a
certain plasticity over time to change various criminal laws as
social conditions demand; but when an offender breaks a law in
place at the time he broke it, even if that law later changes,
there is a promise to be kept." 5 Not keeping it will rupture the
reasonable expectation that the legal norm will be vindicated.1 °6
Taken together, these arguments constitute what I take to
be the "first wave" retributivist critique of mercy.
B. "DEMOCRATIC" DISPENSATIONS OF MERCY

The problem with the argument I have just sketched-that
the punishment authorized by democracy's laws should not be
remitted for reasons of compassion, caprice, corruption, or
bias-is that it invites deeper interrogation of the premises.
What happens to the retributivist critique of mercy once we are
assessing democratically authorized instances of mercy that are
unreviewable?
The third argument for retribution, resistance to the usurpation of democratic power, illustrates this tension well. It appears that this is ultimately a weaker argument against mercy,
at least when mercy's authorization has a legally entrenched
105. Query whether the promise is rescinded when a law falls into desuetude. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy,
Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage,UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAw SCHOOL JOHN M.
OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER No. 196 (Sept. 2003), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=450160.
106. This is subject to the caveats expressed supra note 83.
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basis ex ante. Surely a constitutional democratic regime could,
for instance, authorize compassion, bias, or caprice by expressly
creating a role for unreviewable mercy and delegating that
power to actors within its judicial institutions.
Indeed, the American constitutional regime permits the
exercise of mercy in different contexts. °7 A good example is the
Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement. The Framers of
the Bill of Rights expressly inserted an independent institution
comprising members of the community who stand between the
accuser and the accused. Although it is often viewed today as
little more than a rubber stamp of prosecutorial designs, according to the Supreme Court, the grand jury is legally empowered to refuse to indict a person even if there is probable cause
that he is guilty of some legal wrong. 0 8 The grand jury can also
choose to return an indictment for a noncapital offense instead
of a capital one, just as it can indict on lesser charges than
those that the prosecutor wants.'0 9 Moreover, it can do so in a
way that is judicially unreviewable." 0
The grand jury serves, then, not only to check zealous and
ill-founded prosecutions, but also as a potential mercydispensing mechanism largely unconstrained by legal niceties."' If a grand jury favors a local (and occasionally generous)
mobster against an unfamiliar prosecutor, it may spurn the
government notwithstanding probable cause that the mobster
is guilty of the crime of which he is accused."12 The same power
107. I point this out, not to endorse these particular mercy sites, but rather
to show that the idea of ex ante authorization of mercy is more familiar than it
may seem at first glance.
108. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986). Grand jurors may
sense they have some wiggle room: Currently, the model grand jury instruction says "you should return an indictment if you believe there is probable
cause." It does not say "shall" or "must." For a discussion of whether this
power must be articulated to the grand jury and whether the current model
instruction to the grand jury is constitutional, see United States v. Marcucci,
299 F.3d 1156, 1159-62 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 934 (2003). See
also Simmons, supra note 58, at 3-4 (advocating a robust role for grand juries).
109. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263.
110. See id.
111. One constraint on the effectiveness of the grand jury's capabilities in
this area is the fact that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not attach to the
grand jury's rejection of an indictment. Thus, a prosecutor can always try to
present the evidence against a person to another grand jury and hope for better results.
112. For examples where the grand jury acted this way, see Simmons, supra note 58, at 4-16.
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to acquit against the evidence exists, and is even more controversial, at the petit jury stage.1
As I noted in Part I, this potential for mercy is not an unusual feature of our government: presidential and gubernatorial pardons permit mercy to those who may have already been
convicted and sentenced and for whom good reason still exists
to think they are guilty of the crime for which they were convicted. And, police and prosecutors have the power to act mercifully in a virtually unreviewable manner. All of them stand on
firm, if not uncontroversial, constitutional ground. 4
Given that these institutions, devices, and practices are
part of the democratic fabric, it becomes much harder to say
that grants of mercy-as distinct from justice-enhancing discretion-defy the third justification for retributive justice.115 Our
113. Furthermore, although it has yet to materialize, there is now growing
popular support for the proposition that the petit jurors be told of their abilities to acquit a defendant despite his guilt. Cf David C. Brody, Sparf and
Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1995) (noting that in the first half
of 1995, ten states had legislation or proposals for constitutional amendments
that would require juries to be instructed of their power to acquit despite
strength of a prosecutor's case); Adam Liptak, A State Weighs Allowing Juries
to Judge Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, at Al (discussing South Dakota's
proposed Amendment A, permitting jury nullification). Petit jurors-those sitting in judgment at trial-are currently never instructed that they can acquit
the defendant even if they believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense. Nonetheless, the American jury's powers are substantial. See
Horning v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) ("[Tlhe jury has the
power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts."). By contrast,
jury acquittals in Canada can be appealed on various grounds. ALAN W.
MEwET, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN CANADA 205-10
(1996).
114. In contrast, some nations speak of prosecutorial duty, rather than
prosecutorial discretion. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 57, at 823 (quoting
the German Code of Criminal Procedure, StPO § 152(2), which states that the
public prosecutor "is required ... to take action against all judicially punishable.., acts, to the extent that there is a sufficient factual basis"); id. (quoting
the Italian Constitution, COST. art. 112, which states that "[tihe public prosecutor has the duty to exercise criminal proceedings").
115. This argument may seem to resemble one that Kant made, in which
he said that leniency is proper in cases when society encourages the very
crime committed. Kant specifically referred to dueling and the infanticide of
babies born out of wedlock. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF JUSTICE 106-07 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797). Because
society fostered "a foolish regard for honor," Kant thought there was an inappropriate hypocrisy. MOORE, supra note 22, at 33. But Kant's point is distinguishable. He was discussing social norms that may not have been pervasive
in all classes; those social norms, moreover, operated in a different space than
legal obligation. The argument I have sketched out in the text refers to legal
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law in fact authorizes the possibility of mercy dispensation.
In other words, just as We the People design and are responsible for the conduct rules, We the People also are responsible for
the decision rules that shape the adjudication of infractions of
the conduct rules.1 7
To the extent that this rebuttal argument-the legalization
of mercy-is true, does it reach further? Does it extend to the
first two prongs of the confrontational conception of retribution--effectuating moral accountability and equal liberty under
law?
Consider moral accountability again. There the argument
was that the failure of the state to address someone's legal
wrong communicates condescension and, to a degree, acquiescence to the offender's behavior and indifference to the victims'
interests. In order to make that inference, we must ask
whether that same message of indifference attaches when an
offender benefits from our system, a system that permits the
opportunity to grant mercy. To wit: if I rob a bank, but the
grand jury-captivated by my veteran status or recent immigrant status-decides not to indict notwithstanding probable
cause, is the state really indifferent to my behavior? Can we
fairly say the state really is indifferent to the victims of my
robbery? No-society bears the responsibility for allowing state
institutions like the grand jury to act compassionately or capriciously in an unreviewable manner. Essentially, the law is not
that you may not steal, but rather that if you get caught for
theft, there is a good chance you will be punished unless you

space, which, in theory, is open to and inclusive of all who reside there.
116. Currently, virtually no penalty (aside from a potential political one at
the polls) attaches to dispensations of mercy. A prosecutor, policeman, jury
member-all endure no tangible consequences for their merciful leniency. It
might be said that we cannot have the institution of the grand jury (or the
petit jury) to check zealous prosecutors without the potential for its abuse, and
that overall we value the former enough to permit the latter. The same analysis might apply to pardons or other sites of mercy distribution. The suggestion
is that these sites of mercy exist for justice-enhancing discretion, and when
they are used for mercy based on compassion, bias, or caprice, those actions
can be criticized as abuses of discretion. To the extent this observation is true,
then there is work to be done-and it is a point whose normative force I reckon
with at the end of Part IV, where I advocate the greater use of judicial review,
even for executive dispensations of leniency. As a descriptive matter, however,
the suggestion above seems to rely on an inference of institutional intent or
design that we have little evidence for thinking is true.
117. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
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can consistently persuade a grand jury to decline indicting
118
you.
It is true that one's bank robbery deserves scorn as a matter of good morals, but the ambition of retribution is restricted
to responding to legal offenses, and it is this (positive) legal restriction that both circumscribes and gives (additional) content
to the ideal of moral responsibility for lawful actions."' If the
state and society want to get serious about denouncing unlawful behavior and proclaiming adherence to the ideal of moral
responsibility for unlawful actions, then they have to insert a
check on these institutions
21 0 to prevent actions based on morally
arbitrary characteristics.
The argument seems to run parallel to the second justification that animates retributive justice: equal liberty under law. I
said earlier that attempts to punish an offender for his unlawful behavior are valuable because they diminish the plausibility
of a claim to superiority by the offender. The offender who is
left alone has the unanswered crime to flaunt as evidence of his
superiority. If I assault my neighbor and the President grants
me mercy because I am a war hero or a recent immigrant, presumably we could say that I am being treated equally because
any other person whose case comes before the President may
also be able to elicit the President's compassion (or bias). The
mercy bestowed by the President is a benefit distributed by a
law that everyone had formal equality in shaping.
And yet, there is something particularly unsatisfying about
this characterization, because the President is able to grant
mercy in a way that flouts our understanding of what equal liberty under law truly demands. Presumably, we do not want the
118. See id. at 626-27.
119. As suggested earlier, the reason that retribution does not reach imperialistically to govern and discipline all conduct is that we live in a society of
perilously scarce resources. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT,
TRAGIC CHOICES 74-76 (1978). All responsible designers of social institutions
recognize that if we pursued each moral infraction with the sledgehammer of
the criminal law, we would bankrupt ourselves and leave unfulfilled our other
moral obligations as a polity. The project of retributive justice, as mentioned
before, is one attractive social practice among others, and only a fanatic would
devote the last unit of social resources to the pursuit of criminal justice. (Of
course, the scarcity of social resources is not the only reason to limit the reach
of the state.)
120. As I discuss later in the Article, one way to address these problems
would be the use of independent government actors, such as an ombudsperson,
to intervene and challenge suspected abuses of discretion within our constitutional structure.
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President to grant me mercy merely because I am white or because I contributed to his presidential library. But as the Supreme Court has made clear, the United States Constitution
leaves this possibility open,12' the same way it preserves unre122
viewable discretion in the grand jury's choice not to indict.
And this power, when exercised in this controversial manner,
flies in the face of equal liberty under law, at least understood
in a more robust way. It does this by allowing me (the offender)
to brandish my unanswered crime as evidence of superiority
because the President (or grand jury) liked or shared my race,
ethnicity, or some other morally arbitrary feature of my identity. The same unattractive messages about human status attach as long as I receive a penalty less severe than what I
would otherwise receive if I were from a nonfavored group.
Notice, then, that the retributivist anti-mercy argument
still has power. Its power stems from an idea of equality that
stands outside democracy (understood as facilitating majority
preferences) but inside a vision of liberalism (understood as respecting the free and equal nature of all persons without respect to features that are morally irrelevant to their choices to
commit crimes). This idea is the enduring heart of retributivism's case against mercy.'
And it is also the liberal case
121. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998)
(plurality opinion).
122. By inserting an accusatory body between the prosecutor and the accused, the Framers created an institution that, serving as a "conscience of the
community," can act mercifully-out of compassion, caprice, or bias-when it
screens cases. United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Hawkins, J., dissenting) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061,
1066 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 934 (2003).
123. Perhaps one could argue that retributivism's hostility to mercy would
be stronger if retributivism were conceptualized as moral retributivism rather
than legal retributivism. That is because mercy interrupts the narrative of
privation that the offender must experience on account of his desert. Because
moral retributivism does not obsess about details such as the constitutional or
statutory basis for mercy dispensations, the so-called democratic difficulty
never arises. While tempting, reliance on moral retributivism is a false start.
In fact, in some cases, moral retributivism's position against mercy may be
weaker because of its implicit commitment to match suffering with wrongdoing rather than punishment with wrongdoing. (Hence, some retributivists will
look to a drunk driver who runs over his child and say, "Don't punish him; he's
suffered enough.") To truly engage in moral retributivism the way Kathleen
Dean Moore indicates, supra note 22, one would likely have to examine the
whole life of an offender, including, potentially, his genetic makeup and social
environment. This kind of character assessment places the liberal state in
murky, if not completely tenebrous, waters. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's
Interest in Retribution, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsUES 283, 297-98. But see
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against mercy.
I want to unpack these ideas a bit more. I used bias and
corruption as examples of illicit grounds for leniency because
they are widely regarded to be morally irrelevant to the offender's choice to engage in the crime (or to the severity of the
crime itself). I submit that the same conclusion attaches when
considering extending mercy to someone who is poor, ill, elderly, or a war veteran. To be sure, there are times when someone's possession of one of these compassion-eliciting features
will be causally connected to the commission of the crime, and
in those cases, that connection should be assessed under the
rubric of justice or equitable discretion. But at least as conceivable, if not more so, the feature of that person that elicits compassion or sympathy will be as irrelevant to the choice to commit the crime as when the President pardons offenders who
commit crimes on Tuesday. Consider the case of the drunk
driver who runs over his child. Some people may say that he
should not be punished as severely as someone who ran over a
stranger's child. But to recognize this sympathetic situation
through some form of punishment discount would be to privilege mere bad luck. It is true that bad luck often is privileged
elsewhere in the current criminal justice system. 124 It hardly
makes sense to exacerbate its pernicious role.
There are obviously going to be tougher cases around the
borderline. How might we determine what features count as
morally irrelevant? One possible solution is to employ a stylized
version of the familiar Rawlsian veil of ignorance, behind which
one internalizes all the necessary information except that one
does not know what position in society she will occupy after
having chosen the relevant rule. The value of this heuristic is it
achieves impartiality. Under this veil, I ask which rule of justice would I think is most likely to secure the conditions for
human flourishing. Would I endorse giving a person with this
characteristic some form of a punishment discount? Not knowing whether I will be a victim, offender, bystander, or taxpayer,
Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 1994 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL

ISSUES 117, 142-44 (critiquing Murphy's position). Moreover, it may not be
feasible for courts to readily determine the moral calculus of every offender's
life in the context of practical real-life institutions for each offense on the

books.
124. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment:A Critique of
Emphasis on the Result of Conduct in CriminalLaw, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497,

1600-03 (1974) (arguing that the criminal law, by looking at harm instead of
culpability, too often and impermissibly privileges luck).
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but knowing that I want to pick the most reasonable and attractive rule, I would not think of distributing punishment discounts to anyone unless he had a justification or excuse, such
as diminished capacity, self-defense, duress, etc. Features of a
person that evoked compassion or sympathy would be filtered
out if they were irrelevant to the choice the offender had in undertaking his conduct (or to the severity of his conduct) because
there is no unfairness in punishing persons for conduct they
could, by definition, control, and consequences they can reasonably anticipate. 2 5
Three key implications arise from this analysis. First, so
long as you are committed to the principle of equal liberty under law, you should be skeptical about the claims of mercy. In
other words, you do not need to be a committed retributivist to
share the anxieties about these sites for unreviewable mercy.
Second, various reforms are implicated by this analysis. 26
To list just three: Prosecutors should have the ability to seek
appellate review of acquittals that go so far against the great
weight of evidence that no reasonable person would have acquitted except based on illicit grounds such as racial bias or
undue compassion. Further, we should create ombudspersons
who will have standing to seek judicial review of presidential
pardons, such as in South Africa, where in the Hugo case, the
constitutional court applied something similar to our equal protection jurisprudence.'2 7 Additionally, these ombudspersons or

125. Of course, fair notice is not the only relevant concern. A prohibition
against cruel punishments would also apply.
126. As I mentioned at the outset, I plan to develop a separate paper discussing the constitutional and administrative law implications of such reforms, so I do little more than gesture at such possibilities here.
127. In President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR
708 (CC), a father of a minor child challenged the pardon Nelson Mandela
gave to mothers of minor children, claiming sexual discrimination. What is notable about the decision is first, that it gave the court the power to decide and
review the executive clemency, and second, that it upheld the pardon anyway.
The Court emphasized "that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups." Id. at 36. But in upholding the blanket pardons, the Court perpetuated a self-reinforcing premise of gender stereotypes:
As many fathers play only a secondary role in child rearing, the release of male prisoners would not have contributed as significantly to
the achievement of the President's purpose as the release of mothers ....

Were [the President] obliged to release fathers on the same

terms as mothers, the result may have been that no parents would
have been released at all.

1464

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1421

independent agencies could collect data and challenge abuses of
prosecutorial and police discretion.
Finally, I have given some reasons to think that compassion-based mercy is no less a vice than racial bias or capricious
state action-and for that reason, with all due respect to Justice Kennedy, I have explained why a nation confident in its
laws and secure in its institutions should be ashamed of the
practice of mercy in its criminal justice system.
Of course some objections may exist-some of which I develop in the next section. And there are limits to this account
also. For instance, my argument will not address the problems
or promise of mercy if you are prepared to deny the importance
of equal liberty under law and its constitutive significance for
classical liberal jurisprudence. 128 Indeed, perhaps because it is a
second-best world, some people are willing to make that compromise and are willing to redistribute what are essentially
"punishment discounts" because of failures elsewhere in the
system. While I would not defend that, I would acknowledge
that my account, on its own terms, would not extend to justify
punishment under illiberal laws or procedures. Even with those
limits, however, I think the argument indicates where there is
work to do, and we should get started if we are to lend promise
to the vision of realizing equal liberty under law.
C. DEFENDING, WITHOUT SOFTENING, THE RETRIBUTIVIST
HARD LINE

I want to try to address some objections to the account I
have offered. First, is it really true that mercy is offensive to
ideas of political and retributive equality? Imagine that every
Tuesday at 9 P.M., the state held a lottery in which every prisoner in the nation was automatically entered. 29 Relying purely
on the lottery, the state would randomly choose five offenders
and halve their sentences. It would randomly choose another
five people awaiting trial and drop charges altogether. The idea
behind this ceremony of clemency would be to express the sovereign superiority of the people through their capacity for
mercy.'' Couldn't mercy as political theatre serve the value of
Id. at 41-42.
128. I discuss whether compassion should be elevated over equal liberty
under law in the next section.
129. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (referring to the relationship
between chance, caprice, and mercy).
130. I thank Matt Price for raising this point.
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retributive equality-that is, the repudiation of an offender's
false claim of superiority?
This suggestion seems plausible at first blush, but I think
the suggestion ultimately conflates collective claims of superiority with individual ones. One reason why retributivism is attractive is not that it makes a generalized claim of retributive
equality against the class of citizens who have violated the law;
rather, it is attractive because it communicates, via its coercion, to individuals who need to hear the message of retributive
equality directed specifically at them. Whereas the lottery is
designed to express the sovereignty of the people to the people,
retributive punishment communicates directly to offenders.
Retribution, in practice, is not interested merely in propounding banal social messages; its focus, rather, is in confrontation.
Moreover, retributivism's notional fidelity to the rule of law requires skepticism toward the use of arbitrariness in the production of social meaning. For that reason, it is not just the lottery
of mercy that earns retributivism's scorn but all other sites of
mercy, with or without a democratic pedigree, that afford leniency to offenders for capricious reasons. Retributivism, it might
be said, is a philosophy of punishment for a republic of rea131
sons.
A second objection centers on the role of compassion in
criminal justice, and there are several aspects to this critique.
First, one might ask whether compassion-based mercy, either
at the outset of a sentencing proceeding or later in a clemency
request, is appropriate when the offender is ill, elderly, or dying. Some retributivists have tried to justify leniency based on
these factors. 132 According to this argument, growing old and
dying are much worse in prison than elsewhere, and that fact
adds an unfair amount of suffering to the punishment. 133 To endure illness under prison conditions similarly adds greater

131. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 20 ("The minimal condition of deliberative democracy is a requirement of reasons for governmental action. We
may thus understand the American Constitution as having established, for the
first time, a republic of reasons."). This is not to say that other theories of punishment are irrational or unreasonable, but I do think that retributivism,
properly understood, coheres best with the values of liberal democracy and
what might be called responsible egalitarianism.
132. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 22, at 174.
133. Oddly, Kathleen Dean Moore did not address that this possibility was
expressly contemplated when offenders are sentenced to life without possibility of parole. See MOORE, supra note 22.
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than anticipated suffering.3 4 Under these circumstances, it is
argued, doesn't the denial of leniency undermine retributivism's commitment to just deserts?
The answer is no, but I will add a couple qualifications to
that negative response. The basic answer is that an offenderso long as he satisfies the competence criterion for punishment 135-anticipates (or should reasonably be expected to anticipate) a risk that he will die or become ill while being punished. If we presume that inference, which is not an
unreasonable one, there is nothing unfair to the offender about
the risk of old age or infirmity in prison being realized.136 As I
stated earlier, there is no unfairness in punishing persons for
conduct they could, by hypothesis, control, and consequences
they can reasonably anticipate. Of course, a finding of no culpability may be appropriate if the offender had diminished
mental capacity-but that is individual justice, not mercy. By
contrast, whether a competent person was voluntarily intoxicated, young, old, or physically ill should not matter with respect to whether he can claim, on retributivist grounds, that he
deserves lighter punishment. 137 The same point applies to
134. See id. at 173-74.
135. The competence criterion must be satisfied at the time of the criminal
offense, the trial, and the punishment to satisfy the CCR's insistence that punishment be intelligible to the offender. Specifically, the offender must have
freely undertaken the criminal action and known (or should have known) that
his conduct was unlawful at the time he committed the crime; at the time of
adjudication, the offender had to either freely and knowingly plea guilty or
have the competence to assist in the preparation of his case for trial; and at
the time at which the punishment is inflicted, he had to be able to understand
that he is being punished for his unlawful actions.
136. Cf A. Alfred Taubman's recent conviction and sentence for his role in
the criminal price-fixing scandal in Sotheby's. United States v. Taubman, No.
01-CR-429, 2002 WL 548733, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2001), affd, 297 F.3d 161,
166 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (affirming sentence to one-year jail term and a
$7.5 million fine). Taubman, who had given generously to philanthropies and
was nearly eighty years old when sentenced, may have merited a downward
departure for aberrant behavior, but the fact of his largesse or his age should
not have played a special role in the prosecutor's decision to seek imprisonment. Of course, those factors might play a role in determining what kind of
facility to put the offender in, but those are matters pertaining to the state's
discretion in administering prison facilities effectively and humanely.
The argument about fair notice, it might be suggested, would seem to undercut opposition to the death penalty on the ground that it is unfair. But the
unfairness associated with critiques of the death penalty is based not on
whether the offender had notice of what punishment he might face so much as
the unfairness of inflicting death in a system rife with predictable error and
morally arbitrary determinants such as race or intrastate geography.
137. That is why the common law rule that voluntary intoxication is a de-
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class.13 8 As alluded to earlier, in order to change a merciful impulse into a story about justice (and equitable discretion), there
needs to be a causal connection drawn between the feature of a
person that elicits someone's compassion (e.g., that she is a
mother) and the choice to commit the crime.1 39 Absent the
causal connection, we can insist on a meaningful distinction between factors about someone's background that, in the main,
should not mitigate the sentence, and factors surrounding
someone's criminal action with which retributivism is properly
concerned. 4 ° In being concerned with persons who commit offense against certain specific-intent crimes was a mistake. Nonetheless, other
retributivists have been prepared to justify clemency on grounds of age or illness or intoxication. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 22, at 173-75 (noting that an
elderly inmate's life sentence is brief compared to a young murderer's); Kobil,
supra note 22, at 625-29 (justifying lesser punishment to the extent that the
offender is less blameworthy because of a personal characteristic). Their concessions are mistaken: Intoxication should not matter because one cannot disclaim responsibility for the consequences of action that tends to diminish one's
competence to choose between the lawful and the unlawful. Strict liability is
compatible with retributivism when one knowingly undertakes risky behavior,
and drinking is per se risky behavior.
As to age, obviously a child does not have the same competence as an
adult and should be treated-and treatment may include some hard treatment-rather than punished for offenses. Being elderly should not trigger leniency. The state may decide to put elderly offenders in lighter-security prisons if it decides that such environments would be safer for the elderly and that
they pose less risk of danger to others, but that would not be a claim that the
offender can reasonably argue is his natural right. The claim, advanced by
Kobil, supra note 22, at 625-29, and MOORE, supra note 22, at 173-75, that
twenty-year-old offenders are disadvantaged compared to ninety-year-old offenders if they get life imprisonment is unpersuasive: the offender, by his offense, implicitly authorized the punishment upon himself at the age he committed the offense.
138. While it is true that many offenders are motivated to commit crime by
environmental factors, the truth is that there are many people who have substantially similar backgrounds and experience the same environmental factors
who do not commit crimes. Hence, the Marxist critique of retribution, most
famously articulated-and later disavowed-by Jeffrie Murphy, fails to persuade. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.,
217, 240 (1973). That said, there may be times when social stratification is legally reified and there are no meaningful ways in which the poor and disenfranchised can participate in the project of self-government. In those situations, crimes of a political nature may not be crimes punishable in the usual
manner. I examine this claim in depth in Markel, supra note 68, at 440-41.
139. Or, as the table described at the outset demonstrates, there is some
other reason related to the merits of the case that warrants less punishment:
for example, the offender has reduced the social cost of his wrongdoing by coming forward to the government.
140. Unless and until it is recognized through legislation, the motivation
for crimes should not be a factor in determining culpability or sentencing-
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fenses, the criminal justice system is not required to be especially compassionate because of Mary's stomach14condition or
Joe's advancing age when sentencing Mary or Joe. '
That said, I want to qualify the point here with reference to
the maxim I highlighted earlier, the maxim that undergirds retributivist thought. That maxim is the belief that one cannot
disclaim responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her conduct. That maxim applies not only to the offenders, but also to the policy makers who create institutions of
punishment. Two implications therefore arise.
First, our compassion and concern should extend to harms
imposed on innocent third parties by our punishments. Thus,
an offender who is the sole caregiver for young children or for
aged or ailing parents presents an unusual situation. As a general matter, harms to third parties should be ameliorated
through the institutions of distributive justice, not criminal justice. In an attractive polity, a child without a parent should receive state and communal aid regardless of whether the parent
is not around due to sickness, death, or imprisonment. But
where the state has failed its obligations of distributive justice,
it would be reasonable to tailor the punishment of "caregiver"
offenders in a way that mitigates third-party harms without
simultaneously elevating the offender's status in violation of
the principle of equal liberty under law. The use of a conditional sentence may be one option to explore. Under such a sentence, which presumably would apply for less serious offenses,
the offender's freedom of movement would be dramatically cut
back so that only work and necessary chores (e.g., taking one's
child to the doctor) would be permitted. Electronic bracelets or
other tracking devices could be used to ensure compliance. Additionally, the state may attach extensive community service
obligations (of various levels of desirability). Failure to abide by
the conditions would lead to more severe punishment. In short,
there are ways of using alternative punishments that still, by
their coercion or deprivation, communicate to the offender the
norms of equal liberty under law without wreaking havoc on
unless that motivation was so strong that it destroyed the person's capacity for
reasonable choice. Such reasoning applies to actions motivated by conscience
or religion, such as trespass by antiwar protestors or the destruction of abortion clinics by pro-life advocates, some of whom may believe that they are serving God and saving lives.
141. This does not release the state from its obligation to provide adequate
medical care to its inmates, and it assumes that the factor eliciting the compassion or sympathy was not tied to the choice to commit the crime.
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the lives of innocent third parties.
Second, the state must take all reasonable measures to
protect the basic needs of its offenders, including their lives and
physical integrity. 43 The state may not, in the name of retributivism, simply abandon its responsibilities for the care of its
charges. Thus, if there is a high likelihood that the strain of a
work farm will kill a senior citizen, it would be inappropriate
for the state to send him there. Awareness of imminent risk of
serious harm should prevent the state from imposing conditions of punishment likely to lead to grievous assault, illness,
rape, or death.4 4 Thus, decision makers should alter the conditions of confinement for an offender if his medical condition
threatens to infect others in prison.'45 The relevance of age or
condition would also appear when considering whether to put
juveniles with nonviolent records in the same cells as violent
pederasts. Perhaps the best way to articulate the relationship
142. A slightly different issue is whether punishments should be altered to
increase general social welfare (as opposed to the more narrow situation of
minimizing third-party harms). One can imagine a state saying: We will give
you a punishment discount if you forfeit more of your wealth (or healthy organs) to the state. Or the President may decide to pardon an offender who
agrees to give up some of his rights or a pending lawsuit against the state. Depending on the circumstances, one might think the norm of equal liberty under law was being corrupted by the bargain. If two offenders commit the same
offense under similar circumstances, but one is wealthy, the offender who gets
the pardon in exchange for the donation to the re-election campaign fund (or
the President's favorite charity) is treated unequally to the one without the
funds. For a fascinating discussion of conditional pardons, see Harold J. Krent,
Conditioning the President's ConditionalPardon Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665
(2001).
143. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dep't., 489 U.S. 189,
198 (1989) (recognizing that in limited circumstances, if the state creates the
risk of danger, it is obligated to take affirmative steps to reduce the danger).
Obviously, if the state authorizes the death penalty, then it is not deliberate
indifference that becomes relevant but actual intent to harm the offender under the apparent aegis of the legislature. I will argue that the death penalty is
indefensible on retributivist grounds in a separate paper I am developing.
144. Cf Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994) (holding that
prison officials face Eighth Amendment liability for deliberate indifference to
prisoners who face a substantial risk of serious harm).
145. Cf. Edward A. Adams, Cuomo Faces Annual Ritual of Deciding on
Clemency, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 1-2 (discussing Cuomo's grant of medical clemency to a prisoner dying of AIDS). Mario Cuomo granted clemency to a
prisoner dying of AIDS and to others with terminal illnesses. See Kevin Sack,
Cuomo Gives Clemency to Inmate with AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at 32L.
He later faced criticism for singling out prisoners with AIDS over other conditions. Some states indicate clemency may be appropriate when a terminal illness affords an inmate the expectation of less than one year left to live. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-970 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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between compassion and responsibility in this context is to observe that, for purposes of determining culpability, details
about a person's background do not matter-aside from her basic mental and physical competence. But in determining what
kind of sentencing that person receives, the state is obligated to
secure the basic needs of each of its inmates and must tailor a
punishment that is not indifferent to that person's basic needs.
This point has its limits too. The state is not obligated to
devise punishments that are tailored to the individual because
of factors that might cause one to "suffer" above the norm for a
particular crime or punishment, say, by being deprived of expensive wines to which one has become addicted. As a general
matter, none of those special factors should trigger mercy so
long as the offender was competent when the crime was committed and is competent through the period of punishment.
Notwithstanding the qualifications already articulated,
some might still say there is a further role for compassionbased mercy.'46 What if legislators authorized this compassionbased mercy because this compassion was thought to be democratically popular (and morally laudable)? Think of a situation
where an offender contracts a disease that will kill him in six
months after he commits his crime and there is no evidence to
suggest he poses a threat to others if he were in prison. Would
it be illiberal and antiretributivist for the legislature to permit
this person to die in his parents' home instead of in prison (assuming that was the typical baseline punishment for his offense)?14 7 I think the answer is yes even though I also realize
that some people would say, if that is so, then this is where I
get off the liberal retributivist train and where I transfer to the
compassion train. My response would be that if we took the appropriate legislative ex ante perspective, we would all recognize
that it is better to exhibit fidelity to the principles of moral
autonomy and equal liberty under law than to circulate punishment discounts-so long as the offender could have chosen
otherwise. From that ex ante perspective, to give a discount for
an after-acquired illness would be as morally arbitrary as giving leniency to, say, widely acclaimed poets whom we fear will

146. I am particularly grateful to Steve Sugarman and Steve Heyman for
sharpening my thinking about the points that follow.
147. Ex hypothesis, guidelines would constrain the relevant executive or
judicial decision makers to minimize horizontal inequality between two of-

fenders with the same compassion-eliciting feature, such as illness.
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write less prolifically under prison conditions. 8 (I also think
that as soon as an offender with an after-acquired illness committed another crime because he realized his relative impunity,
people might be willing to realize why the ex ante perspective
should be prioritized.)
A related objection from the defenders of compassion focuses on the nature of the crime. A crime, it is suggested, may
be unlawful but nonetheless carried out in a manner attracting
great sympathy. The star athlete whose reckless driving kills
his best friend and teammate is one current iteration of this
genre. Another heart-wrenching version arose in Canada not
long ago, where a devoted father, seeing his daughter suffer
tremendous and persistent pain associated with her deteriorating physical condition caused by cerebral palsy, killed her. The
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the application
of the mandatory minimum sentence for homicide to this man,
Richard Latimer. 149 There was nothing deficient in the writing
of the law or its application to this man, although Latimer
surely posed no general threat to society and frankly needed no
real rehabilitation. Arguably, his courageous compassion can be
commended, notwithstanding his illegal actions. But there is no
wrong in sentencing him to prison for failing to heed society's
prohibition of taking life, absent recognized justifications. One's
sense of justice should not be offended by Latimer's punishment and the unanimous decision upholding his conviction and
sentence. 50
The last objection I wish to address is the challenge of
Elizabeth Rapaport, who contends that retributivism is necessarily and unwisely hostile to considerations of the postconviction achievements of an offender. 5 ' Call this objection the redemptive clemency objection: it tries to justify leniency for the
offender who performs heroic service while imprisoned or who
has otherwise rehabilitated himself.52 Rapaport posits these
148. The concern about arbitrariness would be a sufficient reason to think
that a properly liberal state should prevent this practice. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra
note 97, at 20 (discussing deliberative democracy and a republic of reasons).
149. R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.R. 3.
150. I am grateful to Ernie Weinrib for alerting me to and pressing me on
the Latimer case.
151. See supra note 103.
152. The example of heroism sometimes used to illuminate the point is Dr.
Samuel Mudd's postconviction distinction of stemming a yellow fever epidemic
while in prison. See MOORE, supra note 22, at 197. He was convicted for "conspiring to assassinate" President Lincoln because he set the leg of John Wilkes
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moments of redemption as hard cases for the retributivist because of the retributivist's alleged commitment to refuse compassionate leniency based on the postconviction rehabilitation
of offender.
These are not hard cases, however, because there is no intrinsic reason why a retributivist must adopt the position that
Rapaport attributes to her."' That is because it would be consistent with retributivism for the legislatureto authorize executive consideration of postconviction good behavior for a reduction in the severity of certain punishments. If we view (as we
should) the severity of an offender's actions as a compound of
the statutory offense and its social cost, postconviction actions
are susceptible to analyses of desert, and therefore are compatible with retributivism. Any determination of the social cost
of an offense considers the amount of social resources needed
on average to prevent, prosecute, and punish the offense. Hence
no problem on retributivist grounds arises with sentencing an
offender, for example, to five years of prison for a theft if he
conducts himself well in prison and ten years if he does not.
Obviously, determining whether the additional five years
should attach will be based on postconviction information about
the offender's "achievements."15 4
Booth. Id. Dr. Mudd, however, did not know that Booth was Lincoln's assassin.
Id. Later, Dr. Mudd was pardoned on the basis of his work in the prison, not
because of his innocence or the problematic trial that led to his conviction. Id.;
cf Margaret Colgate Love, The Quality of the President's Mercy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2002, at A39 ("Even if the legal system were foolproof and no mistakes were ever made, post-sentence pardons would still offer the president an
opportunity to recognize criminal justice success stories.").
153. Nonetheless, it is a position some retributivists have embraced.
Moore, for example, argues that Dr. Mudd should have been pardoned only
because he was innocent and not because he had performed heroic service.
MOORE, supra note 22, at 204, 210.
154. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have struggled with similar issues,
and not long ago, they were amended to repeal the consideration of postconviction rehabilitation as a factor for downward departures when that rehabilitation occurred before sentencing. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K2.0 (2003). The Sentencing Commission found that this factor tended to
benefit disproportionately those with access to private counsel and those who
could afford to "repent" during the gap between the conviction and the sentencing. For the vast majority of (often indigent) offenders, virtually no gap
exists because a plea bargain is made, and in a plea, the sentence is usually
recommended by the prosecutor to the judge. The distinction between postconviction and postsentencing redemption or achievements was not noted by Rapaport, but my guess is that her argument applies to both postconviction and
postsentencing rehabilitation or heroism. See generally Rapaport, supra note
16 (discussing redemption through executive clemency). My own sense is that
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Thus, if the legislature seeks to give incentives to postconviction rehabilitation or heroism, it can do so in a matter compatible with the kind of retributivism I have sketched. By contrast, if a state's executive extended leniency to the offender on
account of postconviction conduct without specific imprimatur
to consider that factor, then such leniency would be subject to a
moral critique that such leniency is improper because it will
lead to ad hoc and arbitrary disbursements of punishment discounts that were not contemplated as part of the social cost
analysis that is properly undertaken in the legislature.
IV. RETRIBUTIVISM AND DISCRETION
Though retributivism may be merciless, it is not heartless.
This conclusion arises from retributivism's attachment to justice-enhancing discretion. Let me clarify. The practice of retribution requires an institutional design that creates room for
discretion, or judgment that is sensitive to particular circumstances surrounding the criminal act. This design is required
for two reasons. The first one is familiar and emphasizes the
likelihood that a complex system of criminal justice will often,
as in the past, commit pervasive and in some cases predictable
error in adjudication and sentencing.155 The ubiquitous presence of error counsels the design of a system in which error can
be discerned and corrected over time, whether through direct or
collateral appeals in the courts or through leniency afforded by
the executive branch or an administrative agency.156 The correcgiven the obvious and predictable inequities resulting from postconviction rehabilitation, however, the Sentencing Commission was probably correct to
amend the Guidelines as it did.
155. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (striking down as unconstitutional the federal death penalty in light of
the mounting evidence that innocent people are at high risk of being sentenced
to death and citing Professor James S. Liebman's study of prejudicial error in
the American capital punishment system), overruled by United States v.
Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 70 (2d Cir. 2002).
156. Indeed, one consequence arising from the introduction of federal sentencing guidelines is the enormous shift in discretion from judges to prosecutors. Because of that shift in power, and because, as is well recognized, virtually all criminal cases settle in plea agreements, see George Fisher, Plea
Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1039 (2000), there is less opportunity for error in the system to be ferreted out. Coupled with the preference for
broad drafting of criminal statutes, these changes effectively empower the
prosecutor to determine whether and how many charges will be filed and what
the offender's likely sentence will be. The opportunity for discerning error is
thus dramatically diminished. This should not be too worrisome if we assume
that defendants who accept plea agreements are convinced of their own guilt,
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tion of error in adjudication is fundamental to the project of retributive justice, and an institutional design encouraging the
prevention and correction of error probably does not need much
further justification-except to say that we cannot afford to
spend so much money on assuring accuracy that we jeopardize
our social and moral obligation to meet other human needs.
More unusual is the second argument in favor of discretion, the public choice argument."17 Without subscribing to the
entire public choice indictment of complex democratic systems,"" I want to highlight one particular insight of this school
of thought. That is, our democratic institutions, our legislatures
in particular, have strong incentives to draft very broad legislation that seems to overcriminalize conduct that might be socially beneficial or at least not obviously harmful. 9 This is
what Professor Stuntz calls the pathological politics of criminal
law.16°
but there is a legitimate fear that a prosecutor who can stack all sorts of
charges at trial with a much longer potential sentence will be able to railroad
both innocent and noninnocent (but not guilty of the maximum threatened
charges) parties into plea agreements. Cf N. Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970) (deciding against a defendant who sought postconviction relief on the
ground that he pled guilty to avoid death penalty but claimed that he was in
fact innocent of the crime). Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing SubstantiveCriminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003). Relatedly, the incentives
of defense counsel must be considered. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988-90 (1992) (maintaining that defense counsel have strong personal incentives to avoid trial).
157. According to one definition:
The public choice or economic theory of legislation explains governmental behavior as the result of interest-group processes. Legislation,
including the receipt of governmental 'permission' to act, is a commodity supplied and demanded much the same as any other economic
good. As such, permission or legislative protection passes to those
that gain the greatest value from it-i.e., those who are willing to pay
the most for it-independent of any concerns for overall social welfare.
DONALD J. KOCHAN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, RIPENESS, PERMITTING AND
PUBLIC CHOICE (2001), at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/practicegroup
newsletters/administrativelaw/ripeness-adminv2i3.htm.
158. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1994); Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the
Regulatory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002).

159. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) (noting "the wellknown fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime").
160. See generally Stuntz, supra note 34 (discussing the motivations be-
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Because legislators have robust incentives to respond to
false "moral panics" as well as real crises,"' they often draft
legislation that confers upon law enforcement officials broad
discretion to bring charges against someone for something that
might not have been chargeable earlier.'16 The federal mail and
wire fraud statutes are often viewed as paradigmatic instances
of this: Congress drafts legislation very broadly, expecting
prosecutors to exercise discretion and to not bring charges
against everyone who actually violates the law.6 The same
goes for the concerns about the drafting of cyberlaw antihacking statutes16 and the antiterrorism measures enacted after
September 11.165
The reason why legislators draft broad legislation, according to Stuntz, is that they want to provide prosecutors with the
tools to go after someone hard the next time. Too often, legislators have to tell their outraged constituents that a person's behavior was legal or perhaps lightly sanctioned-albeit noxious
and socially harmful-because at the time, such behavior was
not on the radar screens of the legislature. But, they promise, if
and when such behavior is repeated, the prosecutors will have
the appropriate sources of law to bring charges-or in the case
of illegal immigrants, to gather evidence about them in order to
hind, and the consequences of, the law's breadth).
161. On moral panics, see PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING
CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998); MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM,HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST AND SHAME IN THE LAW (2004).

162. See Stuntz, supra note 34, at 529-33; see also Developments in the
Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1915, 1934-39 (2002) (discussing the vague and broad terms of the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted after
the 9/11 massacres).
163. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that the mail fraud statute serves "as a first line of defense" or "stopgap device" to tackle new types of frauds before particularized
legislation is developed); United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1079 (1st
Cir. 1997) (stating that the "broad language of the mail and wire fraud statutes are both their blessing and their curse" because "[they can address new
forms of serious crime that fail to fall within more specific legislation," but
that "they might be used to prosecute kinds of behavior that, albeit offensive
to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot reasonably be expected by the instigators to form the basis of a federal felony.").
164. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir.
2001) (considering the applicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to
posting of computer code).
165. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 162. But see Orin S.
Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PatriotAct: The Big Brother
That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607 (2003) (arguing that conventional critical
reaction to the USA PATRIOT Act is overwrought).
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detain or deport them. To avoid humiliation or awkwardness,
legislators draft broad statutes, presuming that prosecutors
will exercise discretion to make sure that those "undeserving"
of punishment will not be charged. 6 ' The problem here is if
prosecutors are too "hungry," the legislators will still presume
that somewhere down the line, the undeserving will get leniency from the jury, judge, Governor, or President. 16 7 Legislators
have little practical reason or incentive to constrain their delegation of responsibility for the operation of the criminal justice
system. 68 In a situation where legislators are merely responding to the incentives to overcriminalize or to permit indefinite
detention, and where prosecutors might be motivated by the
wrong reasons, we should be both grateful for the several outlets we have for the exercise of discretion and vigilant in their
preservation.
The hard puzzle is figuring out how to curb mercy even as
we preserve discretion. Many states have clemency boards to
screen petitions for postconviction discretionary leniency. These
should, as a matter of good policy, be the norm, and they should
be guided by the kind of justice-enhancing principles I have already discussed. Attention should also be paid to those persons
who benefit unduly from executive leniency, for example at the
law enforcement or prosecutorial level. In the previous section I
identified a few possible reforms, such as loosening standing
requirements so that state and federal ombudspersons may not
only investigate but also bring forward claims and challenges to
apparent abuses of discretion by prosecutors and other actors
in the criminal justice system, where currently both prosecutorial and agency nonfeasance are essentially unreviewable. 69 If
166. Cf STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (lamenting the tendency of decision mak-

ers to overregulate new risks).
167. See Stephen Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187 (1991)
(discussing the incentives of various actors in the death penalty context to
deny their role in assigning the death penalty to someone).
168. Actually, because of the incentives politicians have to be tough on
crimes and criminals, they not only create opportunities for discretion by
prosecutors by drafting broad statutes but sometimes they also eliminate discretion by judges by enacting mandatory minima for sentencing or "three
strikes and you're out" laws. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15
(2003) (detailing trend of three-strikes laws). When legislatures act carelessly,
though, courts employ a host of moderating devices, such as the rule of lenity,
which reads criminal statutes narrowly in cases of ambiguous language.
169. Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (noting that due to concerns of institutional competence and manageability, courts will not compel
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regulations or criminal laws are selectively enforced, then application of an arbitrary and capricious standard would force
government actors to articulate reasons for their choices. 170 The
Supreme Court has expressed its reluctance to scrutinize the
decisions of these executive officers because of the relative institutional competence of prosecutors and courts.' 7' "Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the
case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement
plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake." 7 These factors present,
however, precisely the kind of questions an independent agency
(or subagency) may analyze. Indeed, that same agency may
also seek remedies after seeing a pattern or practice emerge
from a series of similar complaints. 7 ' These same considera-

tions extend to enhancing judicial review of executive pardons
or other extensions of leniency that occurred for arbitrary and
capricious reasons.

agency action that is committed to agency discretion whether or not to enforce
regulations); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("So long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." (emphasis added)). As the Supreme Court has noted, a prosecutor's
discretion is "subject to constitutional constraints." United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). These constraints are nominally limited
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). While Armstrong sets the bar extremely high for
potential challenges to prosecutorial action, prosecutorial inaction is not reviewable after Heckler.
170. Cf. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456 (imposing a very difficult burden on
the criminal defendant to show selective prosecution). Presumably standing
law precludes Armstrong's burden from being borne by plaintiffs other than
the criminal defendants, thus preventing the issue from being relieved
through impact litigation measures. If prosecutors knew that their conduct
would be subject to an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious standard, their current power, especially under the Sentencing Guidelines regime,
could be canalized.
171. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
172. Id. at 607.
173. Compare the screening role of agencies like the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Federal Trade Commission in investigating
complaints about abusive practices. These are potential models to emulate in
the criminal justice system.
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CONCLUSION: MERCY AND REAL LIFE
Retributive justice and mercy sit in inexorable tension with
each other. It has often been observed that if punishment is deserved, mercy to the offender is a breach of the duty of justice
and a rupture in the public trust in the reliability and consistency of law. Compassion to wrongdoers has a home, but it is
not in the courthouse or at clemency hearings. This is the familiar trope.
In this Article, I have tried to uncover some significant details that this trope obscures-but also why there is still some
truth to it. In doing so, I have explained why retributivists
would endorse the creation of discretionary sites in a system of
criminal justice, as well as the kind of guardrails necessary to
protect those sites from the possibility of improperly insinuated
compassion, caprice, corruption, or bias. The goal is to preserve
discretion and to canalize it.
To be sure, the problem of wrongful punishment is far
more pressing than wrongful leniency, but to prioritize a problem over another problem is not the same as denying that a
separate problem exists. The unreviewable sites for mercy are a
problem; precisely because they are unreviewable and not subject to predictable interest group maneuvering, these sites pose
a problem that typically flies beneath the radar.
My hope is that by highlighting how these sites for mercy
are a problem not only for retributivists but also for all those
concerned about equal liberty under law, we can find the courage to collectively constrain mercy. For as I suggested at the
outset, there are various crusades on behalf of mercy that, from
the liberal or the retributivist perspective, are fundamentally
misguided. Those who seek mercy directly, and those who endorse reforms-such as greater roles for victims and jurors in
sentencing-that substantially increase its possibility, must at
least recognize the injury they are imposing upon society's
commitment to equal liberty under law. What is more, the good
intentions underlying calls for compassion through mercy provide no real justification for these efforts. For as I also explained, from the perspective of equal liberty under law, grants
of mercy based on compassion are as problematic as grants of
mercy based on caprice, sovereign grace, corruption, or bias.
This last point is one that many good people are inclined to
resist, in part because we are so often instructed to be both
compassionate and merciful as individuals. I want therefore to
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offer some thoughts about how to mediate this apparent disconnect between the virtues of a polity and the virtues of a person.
First, I want to stress again the larger point that, far from
being indifferent to the interests of offenders, retributivism is
sensitive to, and indeed obsessed with, concerns of equity, accuracy, and moral dignity in criminal justice. Leaving mercy behind in the realm of law is, in short, no impediment to moving
forward toward the realization of humane institutions of criminal justice, and away from the misbegotten and often brutal
status quo we currently tolerate and endure. I recognize, however, that this1 7is a promise I have only begun to make good on
in this Article. 1
Second, having focused attention on the anxieties one
might have about mercy granted through public actors and legal institutions, I want to turn to a related question: does the
argument of the Article translate at all to the private realm? I
have left unanswered the question whether mercy should be
encouraged among individuals for noncriminal wrongs, harms,
slights, and injuries. This omission has been deliberate. Like
exist beSocrates, we must endeavor to see what similarities
17 5
tween justice in the city and justice in the soul.
Experience runs in different directions for us all, but mine
suggests that merciful souls tend to be flourishing souls, better
able to forge new relationships and strengthen ongoing ones.1 76
Here, I have in mind the ancient virtue of being magnanimous,
or large-souled. The magnanimous individual is slow to anger,
eager to forget the nits of gnats on his great soul. 177 Fraught as
174. I have made some effort at showing the play in retributivism's joints
elsewhere: Markel, supra note 45; supra note 47 and accompanying text; Dan
Markel, Commuting Death Row: A Retributivist Defense (manuscript in progress) (defending Governor George Ryan's commutation of death row on retributivist grounds).
175.

PLATO, supra note 78, at 370.

176. One friend sounds the following caution: that merciful souls, if they
are known as merciful souls, are more easily manipulated and cheated.
177. Perhaps the most famous example of magnanimity is the patience in
the Gospel parable of the father toward his Prodigal Son. See Luke 15:11-32.
Contrast the father's "merry" dispensation of mercy with the jealous brother's
anguished perception of horizontal inequality:
Lo, these many years I have served you, and I never disobeyed your
command; yet you never gave me a kid, that I might make merry with
my friends. But when this son of yours came, who has devoured your
living with harlots, you killed for him the fatted calfl.
Luke 15:28-32.
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it is with baggage, this aristocratic sensibility is one we do well
to cultivate. That is because the ability to refrain from exacting
a full pound of flesh allows me to elevate the two of us and to
say, your attempt to devalue me through exploitation will not
work. 178
When you commit noncriminal wrongs against me, in other
words, my showing of mercy may be desirable if I value the relationship and wish to avoid the time and energy of resentment. This is especially so if it is clear from your postwrong actions that you have internalized norms of decency and
reciprocity, and you evince your intent to continue conducing
your behavior in accordance with those norms.17 9 Or, I may permissibly and simply be moved by the compassion spoken of by
Shakespeare's Isabella and so many others.' One may wonder,
then, why shouldn't the polity reflect the same virtue of mercy?
My answer is this: when your actions violate rights or interests
protected by criminal sanction, then I cannot speak for others
as I have already spoken with them-through law. It is for this
reason that, with all due respect to Justice Kennedy, mercy is a
source of especial shame for a nation secure in its institutions
and confident in its desire to share the blessings of equal
liberty under law.

178. But the aristocratic sensibility has its dangers: it may cultivate a dis-

position in which we view others as gnats only and always. As Chad Flanders
noted in a personal e-mail: Part of taking others seriously as equals means
taking what they do to you as real and important and occasionally hurtful.
You cannot possibly value your friends qua friends if you read their slights as
mere nits from gnats. The equality undergirding friendship and love requires
a degree of vulnerability for the relation to flourish. Jeffrie Murphy makes a
related point, namely that a person who ignores real moral injuries is at risk
of becoming servile. Jeffrie G. Murphy, A Rejoinder to Morris, 7 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 20 (Summer/Fall 1988).

179. Of course, the private virtue of mercy can be realized through civil
law, for example, when a tort victim chooses to abandon suit of the tortfeasor,
or perhaps, to seek different or smaller remedies than she might otherwise be
entitled by law to receive.

180.

See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, supra note 6.

